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 7 
I. REVERSE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 
WITH A CONSPICUOUS HOLE 
 
Die Ewigkeit hält sich in Grenzen. 
Eternity stands within bounds.1 
 
In 1936, in Germany, the aged Edmund Husserl was finishing the drafts of what in 1954 
would first be published (still unfinished) as The Crisis of European Sciences and 
Transcendental Phenomenology—an esoteric summons, of a sort, for intellectual 
posterity, to notice and to exercise a real, innate ‘vocation’ (though it might be called a 
meditation), which, he thought would free us from the tendencies embedded by a history 
of scientific thought; of technization, and the phantom, objectivity.2 Critique is 
specifically centered about the invention of ideal mathematical-physical space, with the 
powerful statements of Newton (e.g. “Hypotheses?—I do not touch them”) and 
prominent forebears, inside of whose epoch we still mostly live; yet the roots and the 
ramifications of Husserl’s point are extensive. His very precise and indeed computational 
tone would decisively fall on its sword (were this not an address to ‘the lost,’ in their 
tongue) as he ends up discarding the Cartesian subject (‘the thinker’), and hunts out 
‘transgressions’ in primal achievements of abstract conceptualization, or picturing. Here, 
I refer to what he calls the limit-shape: formal perfection, suggested though never directly 
                                                1	  Celan,	  (1971)	  The	  starting	  line	  of	  Schneepart’s	  final	  poem.	  Translations	  from	  German	  and	  Greek	  are	  my	  own	  unless	  otherwise	  noted.	  2	  My	  reference	  to	  this	  book	  and	  my	  quotations	  are	  through	  David	  Carr’s	  translation	  into	  English	  (1989).	  
 8 
encountered in myriad percepts and felt intuitions of actual things; or, the rudiment-tools 
of geometry. 
 
Things of the intuitively given surrounding world fluctuate, in general and 
in all their properties: … their identity with themselves, their self-
sameness and their temporally enduring sameness, are merely 
approximate, as is their likeness with other things. This affects all changes, 
and their possible samenesses and changes.… 
  
There is a limit to what can be done by means of the normal technical 
capacity of perfecting, e.g., the capacity to make the straight straighter, … 
but technology progresses along with mankind, and so does the interest in 
what is technically more refined; and the ideal of perfection is pushed 
further. … Out of the praxis of perfecting, of freely pressing toward the 
horizons of conceivable perfecting “again and again,” limit-shapes emerge 
toward which the particular series of perfectings tend, as toward invariant 
and never attainable poles. If we are interested in these ideal shapes and 
are consistently engaged in determining them and in constructing new 
ones out of those already determined, we are “geometers.…” 
  
We now have an ideal praxis of “pure thinking” which remains 
exclusively within the realm of pure limit shapes. … [they] have become 
acquired tools that can be used habitually and can always be applied to 
something new.3 
 
      
The broad designation ‘geometer’ here comes across as a choice: as a preference of 
character, not an inevitability; hence this ‘geometry’ is an invention quite purely and not 
a discovery. Limit-shapes are of geometers, not of the field of their study: the space of the 
limit-shapes’ immanence would not exist were it not the response to a human decision 
and purpose, perhaps just a simple commitment or covenant on that the limit-shapes are. 
But the arbiter’s focus is elsewhere and other than all that belongs to it; all it is given. 
                                                3	  Crisis	  p.	  25-­‐26,	  emphasis	  mine.	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The Crisis’ focus remains, so to speak, on a wholly irreparable chasm between the 
allotments of life and a pure supposition of formal perfection—an active transgression, 
remote from its field: it applies to the world and is used in the world by a leap between 
natures, despite great effects that we live among. 
 
… the free imaginative variation of this world and its shapes results only 
in possible empirically intuitable shapes and not in exact shapes.4 
 
 
Positive, natural science in general—that which conceives of an infinite relevance, 
universality (formulae); laws of causality, ‘spacetime’ as plenum, objectively—all of this 
is the inheritance of such initial ‘improper’ decisions.5 Though not so much of their 
results, since the technical method is always in process of being refined, as their motive 
or purpose, the whole disposition of natural scientists (physicalists, in the ancient 
expression). Historically, in actuality, humans adopted this search to reflect and to 
represent (therefore, to reach) the invariant poles, a conviction of which has no positive 
basis in fact, though it may in effect of persuasion and dizzying groupthink. The strength 
which permitted this ‘error’ to function, endure, and internally complicate, then, was the 
very same truism positive science believed to be managing, i.e. our limited mental 
capacities, mental oblivion: that we forget. And ironically, through our forgetting, the 
                                                4	  Crisis	  p.	  49	  5	  cf.	  Plato,	  Cratylus.	  436d:	  
εἰ γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον σφαλεὶς ὁ τιθέµενος τἆλλα ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτ' ἐβιάζετο καὶ αὑτῷ 
συµφωνεῖν ἠνάγκαζεν, οὐδὲν ἄτοπον, ὥσπερ τῶν διαγραµµάτων ἐνίοτε τοῦ πρώτου 
σµικροῦ καὶ ἀδήλου ψεύδους γενοµένου, τὰ λοιπὰ πάµπολλα ἤδη ὄντα ἑπόµενα 
ὁµολογεῖν ἀλλήλοις. 
 
But if the arbiter primordially makes mistakes and tries to force all else into relation and 
require that it harmonize—it isn’t a surprise. Why, in geometry, if there is just a tiny 
error, almost imperceptible at first, still all the rest will have to follow and support it. 
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purposive oversight of those incipient physicalists and geometers soon was effectively 
mimed and repeated as method, without some regard for its primary meaning, or for the 
substantial necessities, justifications and motives behind this pursuit; that is, outside, 
removed from, its novel and self-enclosed meaning-horizon.  
 
Quite simply, choice became habit, and habit (in this case, a habit of reading or 
translating all that is given, by certain parameters) came to be pseudo-necessity. On a 
formidably large, but historically bounded trajectory—Husserl chronicles—humans 
effected a ‘final’ inversion of ideal and actual ‘space’ (i.e. total surrounds), and reversed 
their inherent relation of formative influence to one another. For now in fact idealized 
nature was thought a priori (a truth to be found, at the end of all findings), and nature, as 
‘known’ in the most unaffected, the truly profoundest subjective awareness, was merely 
the indirect evidence of that historical, human construction, the space of ideals, for which 
there cannot be a direct attestation.  
 
All occasional … reflections which go from technical [scientific] work 
back to its true meaning always stop at idealized nature; … not … going 
back to the ultimate purpose … growing out of prescientific life and its 
surrounding world …, [in which] all knowledge of laws could be 
knowledge only of predictions, grasped as lawful.6 
 
   
The apparent prevailing of positive science, in Husserl’s nightmare, amounts to a slow 
but imperial push to suppress and replace the immediate moment, and all its 
impressiveness unto itself. A more primal; a suffered, experienced space, where the 
choice would emerge to engage with ideals, with abstractions of quantity, quality, nomen; 
                                                6	  Crisis.	  p.51.	  
 11 
as also the choice or the promise to herald their immanence—this is suppressed (i.e. 
already seems to be chosen, supposed as necessity). Thus, the immediate, rather than 
being an arbiter’s only allowance and proper (in no way a fantasy strengthened by 
widespread occurrence in culture; and not a pretension), becomes but the mediate space 
of translation, a means for the realm of ideals to inscribe its non-present arrangement, 
through which the ideals can be read. What is proper to us in our lives is thus only of 
indirect value; or, matters in reference to spatiotemporal sequence, its place is inscribed 
automatically into the thought of a self-enclosed whole having everything in it, beginning 
and middle and end.  
 
That the formalized, ideal expressions must finally have to rest ‘somewhere’ eternal, 
from which atopôi topôi (Gr. “strange location”) they serve to prefigure, and outlast the 
passing, phenomenal moment; that, therefore, experience settles in immanent reason—
this kind of conviction, related to everything, is second nature, if no more conceived of as 
krisis (Gr. “choice”), as the unsettled matter we meet in perpetuam and which the 
sciences’ promise avoids in infinitum.   
 
+++ 
 
Once Charles Olson, in his customary manner steering in between the scholarly, monastic 
lucubration and the sudden, drunk epiphany, had confidently stated,7 that the Hesiodic 
corpus was a fitting demarcation, for the ending of an epoch unfamiliar, nearly shrouded 
in its foreignness: the scene of its collapse into our own, “of modern history and politics, 
                                                7	  (1974)	  “A	  Work.”	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and science and literature, [etc]…” Less inclusive and adaptable, professedly more 
academic studies, in the modern era generally, have also looked to Hesiod as crucial in 
the history of intellect, as variously standing at the midpoint on a spectrum from Homeric 
and Platonic ‘understandings’ of the cosmos; or between the scientific and religious, the 
poetic and the logical. Most recently: the point between the dark age and the “era of 
philosophy and democracy in which “we,” i.e., “the Greeks and us” … still live today.”8 
The tendency has been to see the birthplace of philosophy and rationalization in the poet: 
the beginnings of prioritzing form and formal meaning, over forces, viz. the force of an 
immediate impression; a beginning to the systematic reading of phenomena as indices of 
ever-present, rationally (and/or, supernaturally) structured oppositions. Now, such 
thinking so imbues, and leaves such great infectious monuments in nearly every spot of 
our communities, of waking life—it doesn’t seem to promise much, societally, 
questioning its basic, inmost verity. Indeed I cannot do so as a citizen; a member of a 
cause; or of a family; a personage—for I cannot contain this thought as property. The 
Crisis… as an artefact of work, is too ironically exemplary in systematic argument, 
precise in its abstraction, and consistent in its terms, to really satisfy its own adherents—
yet, I would suppose that this could not have been avoided in the author’s own 
conception of his proto-deconstructive task.  
 
Of course, the intellectual inheritance, the particolor ‘European Sciences’ which Husserl 
regards—and which it is his aim to ‘see-without,’ to ‘live-without’—derive most 
recognizably from schools of thought and doctrinal assemblages that came into their own, 
in separate circles, in the Classical Age, Greece. The massive, influential pinnacles of 
                                                8	  Stocking	  (2017),	  esp.	  p.	  386;	  395.	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Euclid, Plato—Husserl could not have overlooked; and yet these crystallized expressions 
have emerged and are emerging from a crucible of less self-conscience purposes, 
formidable in weak conventionality. Within the Greek Archaic age, the elements, the 
bulk of signs and energies; and many of the same concerns of scientific study (epistêmê) 
were awake and much in motion, only not as differentiated, specialized, or technically 
advanced. What seem to later ages fully incompatible concerns, along with various 
parameters and notional dominions, have been muddled in a hotbed of ambitions, as 
indeed the case of Hesiod makes clear. The very instruments of demonstration (proof, or 
explanation) are but tentatively, transiently suitable; in contrast, a communal science 
functions (sc. begins) from a significant degree of comprehensible consensus on an 
arbitrary, permanently overlaying meaning for an ‘instrument’—a ‘sign’ or ‘index.’ 
 
Hesiod performed (and it is likely that he also wrote, or dictated his verses to a scribe) 
around the outset of this prior age;9 of course, an untold number of his themes and 
figures, ‘symbols’ have diverse and irrecoverable prototypes and predecessors. Hesiod’s 
Theogony, a somewhat rogue example of a ‘sacred text’ (see chap II), proposes that its 
speaker can ‘tell everything,’ and does so with a song of godly lineage, which starts 
“from the beginning.”10 But, especially in reference to beginnings—of existence, life, 
divinity; the figures that originate the narrative—Theogony is multivalent, and without 
apology. Primarily, the early gods like Ouranos and Gaia (not exclusively) are not to be 
reduced to one (id)entity, but variously ‘are’ and are regarded, with the context: 
sometimes, barely yet personified, the fabric of the cosmos in a naked sense encroaching 
                                                9	  West,	  M.	  (1982)	  suggests	  that	  the	  Theogony’s	  performance	  and	  its	  composition	  fall	  between	  750-­‐730	  BCE.	  The	  Works	  and	  Days	  is	  almost	  certainly	  a	  later	  composition.	  	  10	  N.b.	  thus	  the	  song	  of	  the	  Theogony	  is	  not	  the	  whole	  performance.	  
 14 
on the ‘natural’ or physicalist sciences; at other times, as deathless individuals, viz. 
humanoid, with ‘greater capabilities’ and terrible emotions; or, the quality or facet of 
another; or the figure for conceptual existences—and not to mention metaphor.  
 
An illustration. Tartaros is father to Typhôeus at v. 821ff; despite that, throughout the 
immediate last hundred verses (v.720ff), his name was attached to a labyrinthine 
underground landscape, in which many monsters and gods have defined habitation, 
whose natural features are separately named. In this country of blackening mist—to 
which Typhôeus also ‘returns’ on defeat, as if into the space of the afterlife; even though 
this was his father—“in here,” in the darkness of Tartaros, “lie in good order the sources 
and outermost limits of Earth, and of Tartaros, Ocean, and Heaven.”11 That Tartaros 
holds, in a tight little nook among others, the absolute boundaries and cause of himself in 
his (larger?) expanse—beyond doubt this is not yet the hardest epistemological barricade 
here introduced. These ambiguous pêgai kai peirat’ “the springs and the edges” (the 
temporal limits; historical limits; material bonds of vitality?) certainly jar with the 
speaker’s much earlier claim (in the course of the same ‘revelation’) about the ‘beginning 
of all’ (v. 116ff), which however is also admittedly open to multiple ‘literal’ 
interpretations (i.e. of what actually happened).12 Theogony’s self-pronounced ‘valid’ 
report of the cosmic-religious beginning—because of its minimal depth of description, 
and truncated syntax, would either make Tartaros one of the primary spawn of the 
                                                11	  Theog.	  v.	  736ff.	  In	  this	  excerpt	  I’ve	  cut	  out	  all	  four	  of	  the	  epithets,	  as	  to	  be	  brief;	  but	  I	  note	  that	  the	  epithets	  seem	  to	  revolve	  around	  low	  visibility.	  ἔνθα	  δὲ	  γῆς	  δνοφερῆς	  καὶ	  ταρτάρου	  ἠερόεντος	  /	  πόντου	  τ'	  ἀτρυγέτοιο	  καὶ	  οὐρανοῦ	  ἀστερόεντος	  /	  ἑξείης	  πάντων	  πηγαὶ	  καὶ	  πείρατ'	  ἔασιν.	  12	  “The	  roots	  of	  the	  Earth	  and	  of	  Heaven”	  are	  furthermore	  separately	  mentioned	  in	  Tartaros	  (v.	  728).	  Tartaros	  has	  so	  far	  been	  conceptualized	  as	  underneath	  the	  whole	  of	  earth,	  or	  underneath	  the	  surface,	  “at	  the	  distance	  that	  the	  Earth	  is	  far	  from	  Heaven;”	  (v.720)	  in	  an	  inmost	  hollow	  (mychôi,	  v.	  119).	  Therefore	  as	  confined	  by,	  yet	  delimiting	  the	  Earth	  as	  god	  and	  cosmic	  body.	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primal-thing Chaos, or else his own root-stock. The body of song begins, “Chaos first 
came into being” (v. 116, prôtista Chaos genet’); and “just then” a number of entities, 
names with their epithets, follow without any verb to denote derivation: they could be the 
‘children’ of Chaos—or, like Chaos, have autogenesis. Gaia (Earth), Tartaros, Eros. And 
thereafter, Chaos’ bloodline is treated explicitly (v. 123, ek chaeos); and appears to stay 
separate from Earth’s, which predominates text and performance. The song of the gods 
has been thrice introduced, and thrice previewed: because it is really the song of the 
Muses, its contents are basically glossed in the opening verses (‘before the beginning’), 
which honor the Muses as wonderful archetypes of this (the speaker’s) performance, for 
so they perform in the houses of Zeus on Olympus (v. 43ff). And yet, there are troubling 
differences here between program and actualization: the song of the Muses, regarding 
beginnings, quite matter-of-factly makes no note of Chaos (or Eros or Tartaros); but, we 
are twice given warning that Gaia and Ouranos (sc. Earth and Heaven) engender the rest 
of creation as ultimate parents (see v. 43ff, and v. 105ff).  
 
Theogony’s search for a fixed, irreplaceable cosmic beginning, a singular point to 
conclusively anchor the whole of the context (expressly, the audience’s and our own 
actuality, as divine-physical), bears an unpromising mark in the wake of these vague and 
provisional, inconsequential beginnings, and second beginnings, of logos or argument (cf. 
at v. 1 and v. 36: archômetha). The ‘real,’ as the context Theogony bears, is accordingly 
multiple, imprecise, fluid. The terms which initially notate the basic array of the (archaic) 
visible universe—Earth, who ‘gives birth to’ the hills and the ocean, etc.; Heaven, the 
starry—are gradually anthropomorphized: until, for example, the Earth (primogenitor) 
 16 
travels and searches the earth for a refuge (at v. 479ff), and so on. The actual bodies, 
denoted inside of or underneath name-repetitions, are not then exclusively present, 
despite incongruity: rather, the dark and the misty foundations (of cosmos) pre-program a 
final resistance to definite form in the mind of the listener. 
 
+++ 
 
Between 430-400 BCE, the sophist Gorgias applied the art of rhetoric—indeed a prided 
pastime of his culture—to present a subject equally abhorrent to the common mind as 
Husserl’s critique of ideality, perhaps, to a ‘geometer’. His epideictic feat and flourish, 
known as the Encomium of Helen, is an argument to scatter all the blame (aitia: cause, 
responsibility) from one of the most hated persons in the Greek foundational mythology. 
He does so by examining, in general, a number of our human incapacities. A more 
digressive branch of this extremely well-kempt argument proposes, that a captive of 
impressive speeches, taken in by words, can be no more considered guilty of misdeeds; 
and thereon Helen’s own absconding with a criminal will ground a much more general 
critique of the ambitions of contemporary science; and as an example, it finally stirs 
profound doubt whether anything reaching us mediately, indirectly, e.g. in a speech, is 
inherently worthy of trust.  
  
εἰ µὲν γὰρ πάντες περὶ πάντων εἶχον τῶν τε παροιχοµένων µνήµην τῶν τε 
παρόντων ἔννοιαν τῶν τε µελλόντων πρόνοιαν, οὐκ ἂν ὁµοίως ὅµοιος ἦν ὁ 
λόγος, οἷς τὰ νῦν γε οὔτε … εὐπόρως ἔχει· ὥστε περὶ τῶν πλείστων οἱ 
πλεῖστοι τὴν δόξαν σύµβουλον τῆι ψυχῆι παρέχονται. ἡ δὲ δόξα σφαλερὰ 
καὶ ἀβέβαιος οὖσα σφαλεραῖς καὶ ἀβεβαίοις εὐτυχίαις περιβάλλει τοὺς 
αὐτῆι χρωµένους.  
 17 
… πρῶτον µὲν τοὺς τῶν µετεωρολόγων λόγους, οἵτινες δόξαν ἀντὶ δόξης 
τὴν µὲν ἀφελόµενοι τὴν δ' ἐνεργασάµενοι τὰ ἄπιστα καὶ ἄδηλα φαίνεσθαι 
τοῖς τῆς δόξης ὄµµασιν ἐποίησαν· 
 
 If everyone had memories of each thing past, or consciousness of 
each thing present; knowledge too, of each to come—then logos, speech, 
would not be what it is. … But that is not our fortune; most of us, in most 
of our affairs, supply the soul with recommended estimations—with 
opinions both infirm and overturnable, delivering to infirm, overturnable 
successes those relying on them. 
 … [one can understand this by example from] the doctrines of 
astronomers, who render the invisible—about which we cannot be sure—
apparent to the eyes of thought, disposing one conception as they take in 
hand another.13 
 
 
So, the limits of an individual’s cognition would prohibit universals and objective truth, 
permitting only the emotionally overwhelming sense of these instead. A present power of 
persuasion does not ‘at some point,’ by arguing the heap (of data; sentences, and 
speakers) turn to revelation, nor to a reflection of objective truth. When lulled, or else 
coerced, into the thought and contemplation of objective measure, ultimate surrounds, 
and closed causation—still, the contemplating subject will remain in the amorphous, 
gloomy ‘limits’ of the mind, as accessed presently, and also the effects of their 
acheivements will remain within those limits. Here, the logos merely acts as a peculiar 
force (impression) and as one among so many, on the subject, always temporary, 
transient—albeit as a force that serves to conjure up the the permanent, intangible idea 
(cf. the limit-shape). The choice (for you or me) to be engrossed in objectivity, its 
statements, has been likened in the larger speech to Helen’s—in the ‘clutch’ of a seducer. 
Although Gorgias removes responsibility from Helen for adultery (the ‘cause’ of a 
defining war), in view of Alexander’s planned display of logos-power—as an 
                                                13	  §11-­‐13.	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overwhelming power— I imagine nonetheless his average listener distrusted him, chose 
hatred over pity for a Helen who was mindful of ‘transgression,’ as was certainly 
traditional…  
 
The field of human ignorance is primary and underived—in Gorgias’ view at least—it 
circumscribes and activates the field where, by our actions we engage with ideal systems, 
and with truth—despite the naïve sense that these engagements do in fact connect us to 
the immanence of scientific logos, as the source and the determinant, ‘the truth behind’ 
the objects we encounter, in the field of human ignorance. When Aristotle set about 
comparing and reviewing old beliefs about the origin of nature and the principles of 
change whereby the origin and present are contiguous14—he gifted the conviction of his 
scientific task to a preceeding age which did not fully share it. His assumption, that the 
systematic whole be comprehensible, necessitates that he avoid Anaximander, for 
example. Even though Anaximander wrote a prose cosmogony in abstract terms, his 
system was eternally confounded by the notion of “the boundlessness,” to apeirôn, as that 
which both “surrounds and guides” all nature, as its ultimate archê. 
 
 Although Anaximander cannot have meant more by the term 
[archê] than ‘beginning and origin,’ we shall have to raise the question 
whether the conception of an infinite archê does not necessarily carry 
beyond that signification. 
     — 
 
 Divinity is asserted of the apeirôn, not of existing things or ‘their 
ultimate constituents.15 
 
                                                14	  Metaphysics	  983b.	  	  15	  Seligman,	  P.	  (1975).	  pp.	  24;	  54.	  The	  disagreement	  I	  am	  noting	  in	  the	  language	  and	  the	  thought	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐socratic,	  -­‐scientific	  thinking	  has	  been	  thoroughly	  regarded	  in	  this	  work.	  
 19 
 
The apeiron has no beginning and no end. For Aristotle, presences (as objects) were a 
signature of qualitative alterations, leading from the origin, both working from and 
working toward a self-enclosed, contigious totality. The notion of the apeirôn humiliates 
the analytic search for a conclusive meaning-fundament: since nothing which exists is its 
inscription, or a means of representing or approximating, demonstrating apeirôn. What 
could it even mean that it surrounds and guides all things? Indeed causation and its 
objects somehow recognized entirely would not engage it. As a whole, empiricism’s 
purpose is schismatic and exclusionary: all refined successes in experiment and 
observation follow on (perpetuate) disinterest and suppression of the apeirôn.  
 
The archê of a physicalist normally embeds—in fact, genetically attaches to—all being. 
True Anaximander’s pupil, Anaximenes, would cancel the abysm in his teacher’s 
thought, when claiming that the source of things was air, a substance, notionally infinite, 
but not beyond all comprehension. The anaximandrian ‘idea’ is not possessible nor 
soluble, and rather than composing and becoming the array of nature, this archê 
accompanies each moment and each object, though belonging to no particle of nature—
still its problem is invisibly imposed, at every turn. Although in Aristotle’s certainty, that 
so many observers of reality, ta onta, shared his motives; that their theories could be 
gathered and collected in a totalizing thrust—he had neglected the significance of 
boundlessness (which obviously does defy totality and singleness, non-contradiction), 
elsewhere, in the Rhetoric, he hits upon a more anaximandrian idea: 
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περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ὡρισµένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐπιστήµη πῶς ἔχει, 
ἀλλὰ δυνάµεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους. 
… µᾶλλον ἁπτόµενοι κατὰ τρόπον µεταβαίνουσιν ἐξ αὐτῶν 
ταῦτα δὲ ὅσῳ τις ἂν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις, λήσει ποιήσας 
ἄλλην ἐπιστήµην … · ἂν γὰρ ἐντύχῃ ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτικὴ οὐδὲ 
ῥητορικὴ ἀλλ' ἐκείνη ἔσται ἧς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς. 
 
 As it is, neither Rhetoric nor Dialectic is really a science of definite 
things: they are powers of supplying oneself arguments.  
 …the more that people specialize and cling to an idea, the more 
they actually transgress these arts (of rhetoric and dialectic) … They will 
then unconsciously have made a different science. … Once you hit upon 
first principles [archais], then this is no more Dialectic, Rhetoric, but it 
will be the science whose first principles you hold.16 
 
 
Rhetoric and Dialectic, active and generic powers, make each logic, each specific 
scientific study, make it possible. Within a realm of ignorance, and power by persuasion, 
speech-acts, broadly, both enframe and so inform (successive) realms of scientific truth. 
The power of the speech-act, though, has no inherent aim or end or object. To invent and 
then to settle on objective truth, as based in certain principles, the speaker must forget the 
versatility and freedom of an uninvented power (voice, audê) which has arisen of itself, 
and which does not have a proclivity for some specific form or for conclusion. As the 
nature (i.e. potency) behind the speech-act here becomes unconscious of itself (lêsei) the 
more that it is consciously prescripted as an instrument of reaching truth and knowledge, 
so the apeirôn enables and determine all that is—as well as all that is conceivable—in 
matter and in physics, yet remaining undisclosed and immaterial. 
 
+++ 
 
                                                16	  Rhetoric,	  1356a,	  1358a.	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In Husserl, inheriting a ‘scientific method’ in the broadest terms, meant touting and 
enforcing the assumption that a permanently structured whole was going to be found 
which would account for every possible occurrence; which would underlie and 
circumscribe experience, the world of our experience, as a priori. Certainty, that 
scientific matters will be put to rest—recorded and transcribed by generations, over 
time— amounts to immanence of (some) complete and singular world-order (for its 
seekers), always thought to be at hand; and so a reference point for mundane operations. 
Thus the isolated moments of experiment and ‘theorizing,’ ‘legislating,’ have for their 
validity depended on a notion of the destiny of technical perfection for the method—as 
the ‘form’ of scientific praxis dreamt of in the dream of its progression to infinity….17 A 
gorgianic thinker, who concedes to the unknown as an insoluble, impenetrable boundary, 
comprehends the long development of sciences, instead, as a bewildering postponement 
to infinity. But rather than imagining the reservoir of scientific knowledge as a promise 
and a right of our posterity (society), the skeptic sees a final volatility in method, 
contravention and disjunctiveness defining its momentum and trajectory. The skeptic 
might apply, in fact, to many, many scientific practices, those limiting conditions which, 
for Aristotle, mattered more distinctly in the practice of oration: 
 
ἔστιν δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί τε τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόµεθα καὶ τέχνας 
µὴ ἔχοµεν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἳ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν 
συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν 
 
Rhetoric’s work is with things about which we deliberate, but for which 
we have no system, technique; and before such an audience as is unable to 
see the whole picture or follow a very long argument.18 
 
                                                17	  See	  Crisis	  p.40-­‐42.	  18	  Rhetoric	  1357a.	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Indeed the blatant limitations of the people—speaker, audience—essentially determine 
the effectiveness of momentary argument (qua logos), and especially of insubstantial 
argument relating to what lies beyond experience as present intuition. The cachets and the 
material impressiveness of physics or geometry, etc, would not affect this cognitive 
humility, this poverty of individual cognition. From the first, to follow scientific 
motivations and to humor their propriety implies, in fact, a tacit transformation of our 
dispositions, facing the unknown which both surrounds and interpenetrates all moments 
of awareness. Where a Gorgias—e.g.—propounds the unknown as unknowable societal 
determinant, the ‘scientist’ par excellence conceives of the unknown as immanently and 
inevitably knowable, and therefore as an object (which society determines rather freely). 
Still, this object—total object—would be always in suspended definition, and the impetus 
to demonstrate it cannot be the property of any individual in time—as individually 
cognizant, as witness. Its continual notation in the speech of individuals implies they 
have repressed their own conditions of awareness to participate in filling out the promises 
of some such institution. 
 
+++ 
 
The ideals, the institutional concerns, the propositions and the formulae, possess of 
course an absolutely clarified relation to each other; and a fitness for the very same 
machinery. The problem, rather, lingers like a gap between this self-sufficient system of 
relations, in totality, and that in which we live, of world-experience. A speech-act, as an 
undetermined power, and as possible experience, precedes and so enables the decisive 
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separation of the world of our experience (pertaining to the witness) from the world of 
our communally determined understanding and our purposes (pertaining to occasional 
practitioners and members of a commonwealth). And once we mark the subtle 
prohibition, that the whole of ideal space or ideal nature cannot stand or have effect 
without some human motivation and exertion toward that end, that is, in reference to 
activity; that it cannot be thought of anymore as being latent or as immanent, a permanent 
existence of itself, a thing remaining in our absence but to which we can return without it 
altered… after that, the use of sciences on Earth becomes precisely as perplexing, as 
evocative and stunning, as persistence of religious code. Internally complex as either 
system may become, in terms of doctrine, both essentially connect the whole succession 
of experiential moments, each immediately verified, to something like the object of 
epiphany—a fiction and transgression, if not prophecy. 
 
The problem of God clearly contains the problem of “absolute” reason as 
the teleological source of all reason in the world.19 
  
 
An omnipresent context of immortal supervision is, at all times, thought in spite of an 
immediate perception and its intuition (curious exception: the epiphany of god). C. 
Geertz has theorized an oscillating process of induction and deduction, in the spreading 
of religious ideology, where lurid or astonishing ‘expressions’—things definitively—met 
with in a choreographed ritual, could thereupon affix themselves as symbols (if 
provisionally, still expecting repetition) somewhat more than merely self-indicative (the 
cross, e.g., the fire). And the ‘message’ or the meaning which such symbols brought to 
light would now accompany the people (sometime actors in a ritual) as foil and 
                                                19	  Crisis	  p.	  9.	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determinant for commonplace experience (phenomena now taken to affirm and deepen 
sense of form or principle).20 The Greek verb theoreo—which most basically connotes an 
act of watching—serves to indicate how simply and subtly the function of the senses is 
coopted into reading and interpreting the unknown-as-the-immanently-knowable. 
Transmuted by its frequent use, the verb would come to indicate a purposive excursion to 
an oracle of god—the very traveling to enter a secluded zone of prophecy; and also, for 
the academics: speculation, mental sight, departed from its influences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                20	  Geertz	  (1966).	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II. BETWEEN SHEPHERD AND GODKING 
 
ποιµένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον, 
ἴδµεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύµοισιν ὁµοῖα, 
ἴδµεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωµεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι. 
 
Sorry disgraces, you men in the fields, in the pastures—mere stomachs! 
So great are the lies we can speak as reality, 
And, if we wish, we can herald the truth.21 
 
 
If we are to trust his own report, the shepherd Hesiod received, in an encounter with the 
Muses, the ability to reconstruct the story of the cosmos from its ultimate beginning, by 
divine articulation22—and in verses. The derridean and classicist Pietro Pucci well 
explains the idiosyncratic situation of the poet’s truth as rooted in the figure(s) of the 
Muses, Zeus’ daughters with Mnemosyne (or “Memory”).23 The Muses’ own facility for 
demonstrating truth (expressly, alêthea)—only mentioned post their liability and skill in 
making falsity appear to be reality—would not equate in fact to the reality, of truth’s 
becoming property for Hesiod, or anyone that listens to him. What the Muses witness and 
regard by supernatural cognition is sequestered from their words by the enigma of their 
own capricious language-power (see above). And if, in terms of truth, their whole 
expression is equivocal; and all we have to indicate their general demeanor is a 
condescending scoff addressed at Hesiod and fellows—then as poet he forsakes (i.e. there 
no more is) self-consciousness directed at the speech-act of his demonstration—if it 
would be true. For, like his audience, the poet cannot properly escape a lifelong struggle 
                                                21	  Theog.	  v.	  26-­‐8.	  22	  audën	  thespin.	  Idem.	  v.	  31ff.	  23	  (Pucci,	  1977)	  esp.	  chapters	  1	  &	  4.	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with prediction and uncertainty; have any more than dis/belief toward datum reached by 
mediation, phrases, measures, instruments, although it come from deities. For conscious 
judgment—that which does the mediating—therefore for the poem’s observers: 
 
the locus of truth (i.e., the “original”) is always absent and manifests itself 
only in discourse. … The presence of things as they are does not manifest 
itself in any other way than … imitation, or representation.24 
 
 
Where Pucci finally considers that the faith of Hesiod, as individual—“the Muses haven’t 
lied in what they told me, even though…”—transcends the whole of the dilemma, that to 
aim at truth by mediation is, to some extent, the work of falsifying;25 I may rather choose 
myself to picture, that the Muses speak where Hesiod appears to speak. They literally 
breathe inside him (enepneusan). Probably, possession (inspiration) of a shepherd, not 
the faith, of an already somewhat tried and practiced poet, for example, is at issue. 
Shortly, Hesiod disowns the situation of his life as insignificant (alla tiê moi v. 35), 
facing now the ‘total’ and eternal situation which the Muses “make him sing about” (kai 
m’ ekelonth’ ymnein v. 33). Indeed all usage here of the first person (singular and plural) 
has some mystery. Though Hesiod’s decision to announce himself by name (and to depict 
his earthly livelihood) is striking, in relation, for example, to the anonymity of the 
Homeric poems—we notice that the voice within the poem has taken Hesiod (its vessel) 
                                                24	  Pucci	  p.	  13.	  
25 Products of a mediating praxis (technê) could not have identity with what they aim to represent, or 
quantify, or index. But at best, and by the best technique, a signifier—ultimately severed from the signified 
as autos is from heteros, persuades (sc. overpowers) or escapes the reader’s censure, as a counterfeit of 
something-else-not-evident. As long as we have aimed at things (reality) by mediating praxis—which itself 
is the suffusion of experience by thought—the ontic issues of the selfsame and the different (auto-, hetero-) 
identity and otherness, will seem to be connected, by a spectrum from dissimilar to similar (so, issues of 
discernment and reflection). [cf. Wittgenstein, Bemerkungen über die Farben, wherein the thinker 
problematizes comparison of colors, and the recollection/imagination of a color not now seen.] Analogous 
would be to think of truth and falsehood (notions free of doubt) connected by the spectrum of persuasive, 
non-persuasive (states submerged in doubt). 
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for its object: they taught Hesiod a stunning song. The presence of his name suggests 
ironically a distance from himself, in fact the speaker’s non-identity with Hesiod, while 
speaking. 
 
In privation from the shepherd, and away from their pastoral home, the Muses have a 
single, total narrative (a synchronized, synoptic song), with which they entertain their 
father: 
 
  ὑµνεῦσαι τέρπουσι µέγαν νόον ἐντὸς Ὀλύµπου, 
  εἴρουσαι τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόµενα πρό τ' ἐόντα, 
  φωνῇ ὁµηρεῦσαι, τῶν δ' ἀκάµατος ῥέει αὐδὴ. 
 
They so love to serenade the wondrous mind [of Zeus] within 
Olympus, and in speech accord, to link together present, past, and 
future; running voices theirs, that have no rest.26 
 
 
Because it had been mentioned only several lines before,27 the poet’s curious omission of 
“the present” from the program of his parallel performance (the Theogony itself) is not 
exactly inconspicuous. The song cannot engage ‘what is,’ ta eonta (which translates in a 
later philosophical expression to reality); although it touch, in theory, the surrounding 
framework, qua complete, objective time, with gods as objects, or as subjects, ‘old 
enough’ to populate and structure such a time (viz. genos aien eontôn, v. 33). From the 
perspective of the audience, or Hesiod returning to himself in some reflection, the 
belabored contiguity of signifiers making up the song does not possess the truth in 
evidence but only in suggestion, premonition. That the signified objectively exists is as 
                                                26	  v.	  37-­‐9.	  27	  v.	  32:	  That	  I	  would	  sing	  the	  future,	  and	  what	  came	  before	  what	  is.	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impossible to evidence by signifying (tools of imitation, i.e. counterfeits) as it would be to 
evidence that Hesiod is actually the Muses’ ninefold symphony, and is no more himself.  
 
In fact, the notion that indefinitely higher seats of knowledge (e.g. Muses) can illumine 
for themselves the total cosmos, and that they can then inspire human beings, grants an 
immanence to truth and order—just as did the physicalist sciences in ‘endlessly’ 
constructing ideal physics as (provisionally!) a priori. Yet, there is no point applying 
method, no construction of the poet’s inspiration. What Theogony refers to as the truth—
in the possession of the Muses, who belong to the immortal order they themselves 
reveal—does not at all depend on, or respond to, human purpose. Like and unlike 
Gorgias and Aristotle both, the shepherd-poet would affirm a total order, not affirming 
that a human individual can capture or express awareness of it, or its pieces, by the 
fullness of the logos.  
 
In the model of divine possession, ta eonta, nature undistorted, un-misunderstood, 
perpetually camps outside the consciousness, the essay and experiment. The use of song 
first figures in the poem as part and parcel of a stunning disappearing act, by which the 
(so far, silent) Muses rise and leave the topos of Mt. Helikon, for somewhere past the 
limits of our physical capacity for travel: Mt. Olympus. So emphatically, the singing of 
the poem begins “From Muses of Mt. Helikon” (Musaôn Helikoniadôn v.1). Mostly 
engrossed in the art of subsistence, and busy directing his animals (scene of ‘mere 
stomachs’), the shepherd is simply taken in love with the sight of the Muses: their 
quickness and freedom in games (in their nakedness dancing, expressive, unresting). 
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However, as the story of the Muses, of their songs, and of the poet’s inspiration is 
developed, their defined affiliation with Mt. Helikon evaporates, in view of a connection 
to Olympus, and the head of the Olympians: for there, they have their splended dances… 
(v. 63). The epithet Olympian occurs at v. 25, when first they speak; and at v. 50-3, as 
they recite the tale of humankind to Zeus; v. 62-7, as they sing the customs and the laws 
of the immortals; and at v.114, as they describe the cosmic order Zeus established, 
centered on himself, the foremost object of their song and of Theogony. But they are no 
more known as Helikonian. 
 
   αἳ τότ' ἴσαν πρὸς Ὄλυµπον, ἀγαλλόµεναι ὀπὶ καλῇ, 
   ἀµβροσίῃ µολπῇ· περὶ δ' ἴαχε γαῖα µέλαινα  
   ὑµνεύσαις 
  
They traveled to Olympus, then, exalted in their stunning voices, 
their immortal measure; and the dark earth  
echoed music.28 
 
 
As they first begin to sing (v.9), the so alluring and elusive, private spectacle of dancing, 
the percussion of their rapid feet against the earth of Helikon, gives way to an invisible 
(and inexplicable) ascent to Mt. Olympus. Aêr, void, is somehow fit to cover them. Their 
singing is a transport from “an altar of Zeus Kronides,” symbolic, human-made 
construction, straightforth to their father and the king of gods and humankind himself. 
For both the reader and the shepherd, then, Olympus is aloof and inaccessible. And 
almost like a Bodhissatva, Hesiod remains within that topos which the Muses condescend 
to and transcend: of mental poverty confined to the elaborate productions of derridean 
                                                28	  v.	  68-­‐70.	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deferral (in infinitum) of meaning—of a god within our altars of ambiguousness; object 
of our song. 
 
Indeed the metamorphic journey of the Muses to Olympus would appear to be the poet’s 
first imaginative leap beyond his actual surrounds and understanding. Yet again, the short 
vignette (“all this”) is deemed to be, in retrospect, the Muses’ singing (v. 75); thus the 
poet’s present has been seamlessly dissolved into the absolute perspective of the 
narrative. As also in the Phaidôn, and as keystone in the doctrine of Platonic forms, the 
thought of a perspective of omniscience redefines the present actions of analysis and 
inquiry, that they become mere subsets of remembering. The poet’s very ego, with the 
present of performance, is suppressed, becomes translucent unto some objective incident 
the Muses grant a spurious reality. Precisely this decisive power (truth-determination) 
would appear to be, moreover, an extension of their father’s most iconic feat, first 
mentioned here in preview of the climax of the poet’s song: “distributing of systematic 
order, and proclaiming valuation for each deathless thing.”29  
 
Accessus to the organizing mind (within Olympus) and the effable omniscience of the 
Muses, here depends on self-suppression, a suppression of the present as the center of 
(the suffering) experience. The Muses’ theoretical omniscience—in the manner of the 
‘immanence’ of ideal space, objective time, for later Western thinkers—has been 
substituted, somewhat surreptitiously, as field of observation, for the plenum of the 
moment of the intuition. Hesiod’s Theogony though differs from the history of natural 
scientia—if, as it claims, the immanent and total picture stems not from the self and from 
                                                29	  v.	  74	  athanatois	  dietaxe	  nomous	  kai	  epephrade	  timas.	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a purposive endeavor but from independent, unembodied sources (and by dubious 
connection). The divide between the shepherd’s and the godking’s mountain homes 
remain uncrossed; and objectivity, though granted, must remain beyond the efforts of the 
human mind to touch and comprehend, or to transcribe.  
 
The Muses’ lovely single-mindedness (homophronos), prefigures the ideal of our societal 
consensus as the ‘basis’ of all truth in discourse; notably, this makes them as efficient in 
recording and retelling (making patent), as in simultaneous suppressing, or confining to 
oblivion, the thoughts within another’s mind. “Mnêmosyne bore the nine Muses [to serve 
as] lêsmosyne [as overlooking, forgetting] of troubles, surcease of concern” (v. 53f). We 
are told that the very same power, conferred upon humans by Musaic favor, essentially 
makes the political strategist potent; and furthers the stolid persistence of law in 
confronting an unruly citizen body (v. 84-90). The perpetuation of each institutional 
standard and practice—conformity as ideal life of the state, from the viewpoint of power 
(archê)—would rely on an equal degree of continual (choosing of) self-abnegation, a 
mortification of psyche. The absolute selflessness I have attributed here to the poet, 
allows for the notion that some (non-translatable) knowledge of objective truth has 
resulted through indirect channels in Hesiod’s poem. 
 
The order of the signified is never contemporary, it is at best … discrepant 
by the time of a breath.30 
 
+++ 
 
 
                                                30	  Derrida	  (1998),	  p.	  18.	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The sign and divinity have the same place and time of birth. The age of the 
sign is essentially theological….31 
 
 
Historical analysis can only more confound and make more baffling the speaker’s 
attestation of divine possession.32 M. L. West, a scrupulous interpreter as well as 
‘archaeologist’ of Hesiodic poetry, persuasively suggests, that the Theogony was written 
for performance; i.e. probably compiled, drafted, edited—set down; and might well owe 
its form to many moves in longue durée, not ecstacy. The written work was not at all 
familiar nor expected,33 the performance falling roughly between 730-700 BCE. We 
might indeed consider that a number of the myths involved were more familiar then, than 
was the notion of the text. The poem’s performance, had its model in a history of 
institutional (communal) action and expression, on the other hand. Throughout the 
ancient world, a kind of ‘literature’ which West decides to label theogonic (whether 
written or retained by word of mouth) appeared in myriad performances of ritual, integral 
to the ritual’s efficacy in putting gods and humans into dialogue. In general, a chronicle 
of gods ‘from the beginning’ (ex archês), its recitation, momentarily, at least—would 
light the path which has arrived at the performance, at the present: what is taken for 
reality.34 A well-rehearsed and choreographed ‘placing’ of the ritual’s participants—their 
                                                31	  Idem,	  p.	  14.	  32	  cf.	  Kierkegaard,	  Training	  in	  Christianity,	  “The	  Offence”	  esp.	  pp.	  96-­‐99.	  Trans.	  Lowrie.	  Where	  he	  says,	  of	  Christ:	  …	  we	  must	  begin	  with	  not	  knowing	  who	  He	  is,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  in	  the	  situation	  of	  contemporaneousness	  with	  an	  individual	  man,	  who	  is	  like	  other	  men,	  in	  whom	  there	  is	  nothing	  directly	  to	  be	  seen,	  an	  individual	  man	  who	  thereupon	  performs	  a	  miracle	  and	  himself	  says	  that	  it	  is	  a	  miracle	  he	  performs.	  What	  does	  this	  signify?	  	  33	  (West,	  1982)	  p.	  44-­‐47.	  	  34	  Idem,	  p.	  1f	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present, as minutely comprehensible to each—within the ‘revelation’, nonetheless made 
firm in a tradition with intentions of societal posterity.  
 
Theogony, the poem, was not explicitly a part of solemn rite,35 however serious and 
formal of an interest it displays in these ‘religious’ goals. The poet enters, certainly less 
potent in his image than the king or wealthy ‘noble’ who would volunteer, for instance, 
as a leader in communal rite of sacrifice, to conjure up the gods’ attentions. Hesiod, with 
closer to the credibility of an Odysseus, qua washed ashore, retells before a crowd of 
individuals, how he alone met Muses and received the voice of gods. Indeed, why him? 
Why choose this shepherd? Though the Muses’ will is surely uninterrogable (which is in 
itself a reason), their existence anyway still hangs upon the shepherd’s self-pronounced 
‘inspired’ telling, which by nature is untestable. By exiting the setting of the 
concentrated, ritual and prayer (and at the same time by so dimly, enigmatically 
portraying the demeanor of the Muses) the Theogony’s ‘ambassador’ or speaker only 
ushers in a greater conscious criticism, questioning the source of speech.  
 
In lieu of singer’s instrument, he brandishes the skêptron of the Muses, which indeed 
comprises all substantial proof of that encounter. As a marker, being gifted on the instant 
of the transference of singing-power, this unique example of a skêptron, “a stupendous, 
leafy branch” (daphnês eritheleos ozon, … thêêton, v. 30) “of bay or laurel,” was to bear 
the weight of proof for its possesor’s total knowledge. Truly, absent this as trusted token, 
all would rest, and so does rest, on power of persuasion. For the carrying of skêptra could 
traditionally indicate a diverse range of offices, of functions and of ranks. As yet 
                                                35	  Idem,	  p.	  15-­‐16	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unqualified by context, it was that which someone held while making claims, that is, 
regardless of their aptitude to govern or to educate. Displacement of the text from a 
religious context (choreographed ritual) has robbed the branch of  ‘possible’ symbolic 
and authoritative force. Although the document retains the formal content of a theogonic 
utterance in general—transformed as it relates now to an audience of fellow human 
beings, the poem’s performance would expose its own condition as unverified, suspicious 
and insoluble; and not forget, as other breeds of speech forget, that argument cannot 
transcend persuasion.  
 
So, despite that the Theogony has merited (and merits, consequentially) a formative 
position in relation to the Greek religious universe; appears to have done half of all the 
work in making gods a point of thought and conversation, at the dawn of our distinctive 
Western politics and culture,36 it appears to have been drafted in response to an existing 
form; and not as a conventional example, but exemplary as reformation, self-critique. The 
need for; the efficacy of certain formal instruments for ‘reaching’ the divine is here 
implicitly on trial. The impressive externalities, the trappings of a sacrificial rite, are 
under scrutiny as such; are introduced in such a way as should encourage our discretion: 
it remains to be disclosed if they are forces of contrivance that enable ideologies to 
circumvent or overwhelm the judgment. This most helpless ambiguity extends to the 
entirety of Hesiod’s performance, such that gods are irreducibly considered both as 
catalysts of culture and as products of the same; so that Theogony will vacillate in nature 
and in worth, between an ultimate, impersonal achievement of the grounds of the 
                                                36	  see	  Herodotus,	  Histories	  II.53.	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experiential present, or the ultimately groundless application of societal constructions, as 
obscurant of reality, impediment to true perception. 
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III. A METHOD, SACRIFICE  
 
Ourselves within the tune, as if in space, 
And nothing changed, except the place…37 
 
 
In light of the Theogony’s apparent ‘abdication’ from the setting of the rite, as from an 
architechted atmosphere, a pre-designed potential for experience—the narrative, within 
the poem, which tells of the invention of the sacrificial custom (v. 535ff) takes on infinite 
allure; the speaker puzzlingly hides the very origin of humankind within this revelation of 
the origin of custom. Human beings are already at a gathering with gods, when they 
appear: as yet their origin has nowhere been described, despite the poem’s overt 
obsession with beginnings, etiology. Instead, as ‘new beginning,’ second origin, the 
learning of the sacrificial custom from Prometheus delivers them to punishment by Zeus: 
an irrevocable reforming of their nature and their quality of life, with the creation of 
(Pandora as)38 the proto-woman.  
 
Next to the dramatic and sensorial description of the proto-woman, crafted out of earth 
and water, clothed in hammered silver, gold, and made to fit the king of gods’                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
designs (hikelon Kronideô dia boulas, v. 572)—certainly the silence of the speaker on the 
nature of humanity before this point is onerous and troubling. They do not have material 
or formal cause; they do not have a past. In fact the dawn of human nature, as we know it, 
is the granting of momentum to a project of occlusion: not creation, but abrupt 
                                                37	  Wallace	  Stevens,	  The	  Man	  with	  the	  Blue	  Guitar,	  vi.	  38	  She	  is	  not	  so	  named	  in	  the	  Theogony,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  copy	  (reformation)	  of	  this	  story,	  as	  it	  figures	  in	  
The	  Works	  and	  Days.	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adjudication on an uncreated, undetermined thing, to fix and alter it; the loss of that 
unqualified, yet definitely prior state, in any case, to one ordained, a prescript: to 
‘miscegenate’ with god’s contrivance (proto-woman). 
  
Later Greek attempts to reimagine the invention of the sacrifice—particularly, as it stands 
in Hesiod, the animal, blood-sacrifice—concluded in like manner with a proto-legal 
utterance (“From now on…”).  However, the immortals, in these stories, rather pardoned 
the caprice, the independent and unsupervised decisions of a mortal, who without explicit 
template or example, chose to sacrifice an animal.39 In contrast, humankind in the 
Theogony, both mutely and impassively, inherits a divine invention. Truly incidental, in 
this theocentric record, to a narrative digression on the devious exchanges of Prometheus 
and Zeus, the proto-humans have no action in the crime for which they too are punished; 
no iconic figure, no emotional response. The poem’s speaker grants them only but a 
couple passive states—i.e. modalities of being—namely, being-set-apart from the 
immortals; being-awestruck at the spectacle of proto-woman. These two excerpts 
represent the opening and closing of the action in this episode, which I will call ‘the 
sacrifice’ for short. Within the grammar of these sentences, the mortal situation is 
inseparable, not yet independent from the gods (but they co-operate in verbum). 
 
καὶ γὰρ ὅτ' ἐκρίνοντο θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι 
Μηκώνῃ, τότ' ἔπειτα µέγαν βοῦν πρόφρονι θυµῷ   
δασσάµενος προύθηκε, Διὸς νόον ἐξαπαφίσκων. 
 
 This was when mortals and gods took their separate positions, at 
Mêkônê: that day [Prometheus] placed a great ox before everyone, which, 
                                                39	  Instead	  of	  something	  vegetal;	  inanimate	  like	  incense.	  For	  the	  stories,	  see	  Naiden’s	  Essay	  “Polis	  Religion	  and	  Sacrificial	  Regulation”	  (Hitch	  &	  Rutherford	  2017).	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in a buzzing of thought he had cut up already, to overwhelm Zeus’ 
intelligence. 40 
 
   — 
 
θαῦµα δ' ἔχ' ἀθανάτους τε θεοὺς θνητούς τ' ἀνθρώπους,   
ὡς εἶδον δόλον αἰπύν, ἀµήχανον ἀνθρώποισιν.     (v. 588-9) 
  
 Wonder then held the immortals, the gods, and the mortals, the 
humans—because they had looked on an utter deception [i.e. proto-
woman], which humans cannot figure out.41 
 
 
In general, the speaker has quite intricately ‘broken up’ and reconstructed time, within 
the sacrifice (divergent from the linear and non-disjunctive mode of genealogy which 
governs the Theogony)—such that the reader regards the entire, millenia-long retribution 
of godly Prometheus, prior to any connection he carries to mortal humanity (v. 521-34). 
Basically, Zeus’ response to another immortal’s direct provocation (the paradox that he 
would first of all wish to be beaten, deceived by a god; to ingeniously punish, and later to 
temper his anger at same)—this preeminent narrative arc is completed before it develops 
a meaning for all of humanity. More, Epimetheus—well to the contrary of his appearance 
in Erga kai Hêmera,42 barely has narrative presence: he seems to exist, for the nonce, so 
that Mêkônê’s mortals do not have to put forth an actor or personage, even to bear their 
own verdict. For nothing quite clarifies how, after taking ‘Pandora,’ the god Epimetheus 
passes this punishment on to humanity. 
                                                40	  Theog.	  v.	  535-­‐7	  41	  v.	  588-­‐9	  42	  I	  should	  have	  liked	  to	  compare	  the	  remarks	  of	  this	  paper	  in	  general	  to	  the	  few	  opening	  myths	  of	  the	  other,	  less	  godly,	  more	  pragmatic	  work	  of	  the	  author.	  The	  bond	  of	  these	  works,	  which	  is	  patent	  at	  first	  because	  both	  have	  their	  ‘versions’	  of	  how	  human	  beings	  were	  given	  Pandora.,	  has	  much	  to	  be	  said	  for	  it.	  On	  this	  occasion	  I	  simply	  note	  that	  in	  Erga	  kai	  Hêmera,	  Epimetheus	  actually	  figures	  in	  the	  narrative,	  literally	  forgetting	  the	  warnings	  of	  his	  brother	  Prometheus;	  privately	  falling	  for	  the	  spectacle	  of	  Pandora.	  In	  Theogony,	  the	  god’s	  reception	  of	  Pandora	  first	  occurs	  outside	  and	  eighty	  lines	  beofre	  the	  narrative,	  as	  sidenote	  in	  the	  work	  of	  genealogy;	  but	  in	  the	  myth,	  there	  isn’t	  any	  reference	  to	  it.	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Typically, as has been noted, theogony inside the context of rite (viz. accompanying or 
described by a sacrifice) grounded the present occasion within a (divine or religious) 
totality, which was the whole of its content. Subjective (viz. human) experience wedded 
itself to the thought of a certain ‘beyond and before,’ of the which it became an 
interpreter, over and over, and probably less and less consciously. But, the Theogony’s 
speaker, in act of revealing an outermost frame to experience, casts to oblivion what were 
the roots of humanity: for, in the self-enclosed whole of Theogony’s cosmos, the humans 
are not of the gods’ cerebrations and have no discernible genesis; but they collide with 
the realm of the (text of the) gods from unspecified regions. As such, they are helpless 
accessories, all unreflectively bound to immortal offense and revenge. If the gods had 
created them, and if the humans themselves had committed the crime… then the myth 
would have closely prefigured ‘The Fall’ as in Genesis. Here is no Eden, however; and 
here the damnation is solely by dint of defection among the immortals themselves (the 
Theogony’s proto-humanity is not deceived and need not be). 
 
The compact of mortals and gods has begun, for the Greeks, with the fall and vice versa. 
The scene of the feast would appear to imply repetition, tradition, a definite history of 
interaction for mortals and gods, but the notion of any alliance or culture has not been 
established; only dissolved, in the poem. Although J.-P. Vernant may extrapolate much 
on the nature of humans before this occasion at Mêkônê,43 as it appears in the sanctified 
words of the poem: they begin to relate to immortals by being removed from immortal 
                                                43	  (Vernant,	  1987)	  He	  imagines	  them	  feasting	  with	  immortals	  over	  and	  over	  before	  this	  point,	  having	  no	  death	  or	  health	  problems,	  etc.	  Most	  of	  this	  is	  taken	  out	  of	  Works	  and	  Days	  directly,	  or	  Vernant	  is	  simply	  reading	  too	  prosaically	  with	  manifold	  enhancements	  by	  his	  ‘common	  sense.’	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society (see v. 535 above: “ekrinonto,” the verb by which humans have entered 
Theogony, sets them apart from the gods; this division will prove to be lasting). 
Prometheus’ trick—of cutting up and reassembling the pieces of an animal, is 
simultaneously the beginning of damnation for humanity and archetype for mortals to 
beseech the gods’ good will. 
 
     … κακὰ δ' ὄσσετο θυµῷ 
   θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισι, τὰ καὶ τελέεσθαι ἔµελλε. 
   … χώσατο δὲ φρένας ἀµφί, χόλος δέ µιν ἵκετο θυµόν, 
   ὡς ἴδεν ὀστέα λευκὰ βοὸς … 
   ἐκ τοῦ δ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἐπὶ χθονὶ φῦλ' ἀνθρώπων 
   καίουσ' ὀστέα λευκὰ θυηέντων ἐπὶ βωµῶν. (v. 551-67) 
 
 For mortal human beings, Zeus imagined ruin; he would make it 
so. His thought was rancorous, and anger took his spirit: he had seen the 
ox’s whitish bones. … 
 And ever since, societies of human beings roast the whitish bones 
for the immortals, on the smoking altars, all across the land.  
 
 
The very root, then, and the cause of the im/mortal schism, acted out sine fine in rituals, 
has opened up a window through which gods and humans speak and feed relations. So, 
an instance of (commemorating) sacrifice at least appears to bridge the gap which 
sacrifice in general has opened irrevocably.44 Without the slightest inkling of a past, the 
human being stands in reference to immortals from now on, and too distorted as a 
consequence of their so clearly cruel but petty games; which human destiny must copy. 
Rendering this or that animal matter to nothing but fuel for the fire and smoke of the 
altar, a Greek individual thinks of and acts in regard to, enables an ancient and ongoing 
project of parallel though incompatible cultures—as far as Theogony sees it. 
                                                44	  Vernant	  (1989)	  has	  said	  as	  much	  p.	  24,	  35.	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+++ 
 
A. Henrichs and others have recently urged for substantial revision of 20th Century 
classical scholarship’s major approaches to polytheism and rite in Greek poleis. The 
anthropocentric concerns (which proceeded from Freud and through Burkert) of animal 
killing and eating; of human emotion, anxiety; politics—which in the 20th C. dominate 
critical focus—are now in some places redacted as not-so-well-closeted atheist, or at best 
modernist judaeo-christian perspectives. The analysts’ predispositions are seen to effect 
the collecting and reading of evidence.45 Firstly, in modernist interpretation, the ancient 
belief in the being of gods and immortals is easily labeled a subsequent fact to the 
presence of human contrivance, a product of primary, human behavior. However, 
  
 From a Greek point of view, the gods not only existed prior to the 
rituals practised in their honour but were regarded as the ultimate raison 
d’être for these rituals. Indeed, Greek texts and vase paintings represent 
gods … engaged in ritual performance as ‘first inventors,’ … and thus as 
divine role models for the human practitioners. … 
 It is neither practical nor advisable to study the two entities 
separately.46 
 
F. Naiden more recently (2013) set an alternative standard in ‘ritual’ sacrifice theory 
(which de-emphasizes the term), in his basic assertion that complex arrangements of 
ritual action are always determined by states in an unbroken context of actual gods, as 
observers and judges (thus following Henrichs contention that ancients were actually 
                                                45	  S.	  Georgoudi,	  F.	  Naiden,	  Van	  Straten,	  etc,	  separately	  question	  the	  popular	  themes	  of	  the	  victim’s	  willingness;	  human	  regret;	  the	  centrality	  of	  killing	  in	  the	  rite;	  that	  sacrifice	  preceded	  every	  meat-­‐consumption;	  that	  the	  animal,	  blood-­‐sacrifice	  was	  oftenest	  applied….	  46	  Henrichs,	  “What	  is	  a	  Greek	  God?,	  from	  The	  Gods	  of	  Ancient	  Greece,”	  (Bremmer	  &	  Erskine,	  2013),	  p.	  26	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polytheistic). The actors, performers of sacrifice, knew (or assumed) the immortals 
remembered their previous dealings: immortals had, so to speak, written a permanent 
record of contact with these individuals, who in performance adjusted decorum and 
prayer in accordance with that divine-personal narrative-history—at least, as far as the 
ritual actors remembered or else comprehended it. Often participants asked for a change 
in the future, and promised to sacrifice later as well; and in this manner each individual 
“sacrifice became comprehensible as part of a sequence—as an episode, not a self-
contained event.”47 As Sarah Hitch has noted in review of Naiden’s recent book, 
reorienting focus to an omnipresent context of immortals makes a functionable model for 
assessing a diverse array of sacrificial rituals: before becoming muddled in typology and 
categorization, they are always and most basically communicative gestures, 
conversations of the mortal generations with the “γενος αἰεν ἐοντων.”  
 
Regardless of the victims (Gr. ta hiera), whose pathos so engrossed the vogue in 
scholarship on Greek religion, Naiden’s sacrificial model only sees the feeding of the 
fire, that it smoke upon the altar, as essential and a critical determinant. The knîsa, or the 
scent of burning offerings, assumed to reach the gods, aesthetically (by metaphorical 
transference) would embody human prayer, in its arising and diffusing “in the larger 
scene, the context in which… god responded.” Answers could be ‘read’ in things, 
deciphered by a motley of divinatory practices applied to different elements, again within 
the confines of the rite: e.g. the color of some nodule on a liver served to indicate 
immortals’ dispositions, indirectly.  
 
                                                47	  Naiden	  (2015),	  p.	  25.	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+++ 
 
Prometheus’ sacrificial ‘offerings’—a choice between the heartiest of ox-meat, yet 
concealed within an unbecoming stomach-pouch, and all the ox’s bones, yet covered over 
by a tempting skein of fat—these ‘portions’ instigate a crisis of ontology and semiotics. 
Very much persistently, the episode has figured through the history of structuralist and 
deconstructive discourse,48 not alone because its theme of the antinomy (or else non-
correlation) of apparent and essential value, ties the trick of sacrifice directly to the 
semiotic quandary of the shepherd with the Muses’ voice, that truth is not accessible 
directly (and since structuralist theory was devoted to linguistic theory). Even though the 
trick does not itself involve a prayer (of course the proto-humans do not ask for 
anything), still Zeus has been solicited as reader or interpreter: his answer is impatiently 
anticipated in the very gesture of the offering.49 What choreographed happenings appear 
to be, is yet to be determined by the status of the ‘reader’ in relation to a ‘secretive 
society,’ composed of the initiates in latent meaning: that which will appear in ‘last 
analyses,’ if such exist. The sign (device of signifying) carries meaning fully independent 
and regardless of a signified. 
 
And like the sign the choice of Zeus quite inexplicably occurs in perpetuity, or 
permanence: it is the form of sacrifice—forever, since the first and for posterity. Or 
otherwise the action of Prometheus impends its repetition by our generations (not that 
this was part of some explicit wager made with Zeus before the choice; it seems to be 
                                                48	  Stocking	  (2017).	  	  49	  prophroni	  thumôi	  v.	  536;	  and	  v.	  547-­‐50:	  Prometheus’	  eagerness.	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inevitable). Thus the grotesque portions of the ox prefigure all the indirect (or semiotic) 
means of human-god communication. We recall that humans have arrived at the immortal 
context (that of the Theogony, the world that it reveals or else constructs) by being placed 
at a remove from it, and at the same time, ‘sentenced’ by the opening of sacrificial 
custom to an active, frequent maintenance of bonds across this distance. An eternal, 
existential wall or else abysm constitutes the self-enclosed relation of im/mortals—as it 
always presupposes some translation, force of mediation. Here, it is the altar-fire.50 
Oftentimes, the altar-fire and the logos (prayer and theogonic song). Or else, as here, the 
logos unaccompanied (Theogony).  
 
Scholars like Burkert, Vernant, Detienne—who have hugely affected the common 
opinions of ancient Greek ritual (and of religion in general); anthropocentric (viz. 
psycho- and sociological) writers—would have to ignore, or manipulate details within the 
Theogony’s relevant, certainly formative evidence, if they would hold to their deepest and 
broadest convictions (hypotheses and suppositions). In terms of the rite of the sacrifice, 
elements 20th C. scholarship duly examined—the human participants, facing an animal 
victim, or meal—are of barely peripheral interest in Hesiod’s text. As aside from the 
general, miniscule weight of humanity in the Theogony’s telling (in terms of both action 
and suffering; already mentioned)—the subtle discretion displayed by the speaker effects 
that no action of killing or eating expressly occurs in the narrative. Far from a feast, the 
creation of only two portions (the meat is not carved for a meal as in Homer) suggests 
that the krisis, the judgment itself in deciding the matter, is central, and not the result of 
                                                50	  Georgoudi	  (2017)	  paraphrases	  Svenbro:	  “combustion	  …	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  victim	  is	  wholly	  or	  partly	  ‘destroyed’	  or	  ‘annihilated.’	  It	  is	  rather	  communicated,	  by	  means	  of	  combustion,	  to	  the	  supernatural	  recipients.	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the choice in a pleasant or offputting meal. For, Prometheus offers the unrecognizable 
animal here as a sport for the mind, not as means of subsistence for stomachs (cf. Dios 
noon v. 537; and tôn d’eleu hoppoterên se eni phresi thumos anôgei v. 549). 
 
Prior to the sacrifice, the ‘animals’ have also had no history. The speaker had omitted 
them in populating all the wooded hills and haunts of earth (v. 129ff), where nymphs 
abound; and several times describes the sea as barren (atrugetos, e.g. v. 242), even 
though it is filled up with further nymphs and deities. A litany of monsters and 
composite-creatures share in the divine, and are anomalous, not bearing on the presence 
of real animals, not born from them. The fates, who preside over ends for the living, do 
not regard animals (v. 220). There is no birth or creation of animals proper. The presence 
and utilization of animals, both for immortals and mortals, is groundlessly given, 
however. The very few positive mentions of animals in the Theogony, even which seem 
to precede the great ox of Prometheus, prove to refer to their status as servants and 
‘means to an end’ in a ‘post-promethean’ society. Hesiod worked as a shepherd (v. 22); 
and praising Hekate’s support for the human ambitions, he points to her aid for the riders, 
the fishermen, herdsmen, and goatherds (v. 439ff), etc. Nonetheless, there is no animal in 
the Theogony free from im/mortal prerogatives, or unappended to im/mortal (i.e. post-
sacrifice) history. 
 
Nor does Prometheus lead in a live ox and kill it. The status of death is subsumed in the 
action of “cutting, apportioning” which, it appears, he has finished without being noticed, 
before the whole narrative opens (dassamenos v. 536). The animal is not then physically 
present as referent, once, for the name which denotes its existence in nature (cf. megan 
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boun): but at first, it is no more an ox, not alive and not dead,51 but a novelty reached by a 
private and prior decision, concealing the ox with the ox; an effacement and self-
substitution. A purposed division and recombination of such unmistakeable matter, the 
animal, brings us duplicitous portions, apparently and—in a latent and ‘ultimate 
reasoning’—actually opposite: therefore alike in their equivocality and/or apparent 
untruth. The surprise introduction of portions, which furthermore lies at the heart of the 
splitting-apart-and-reforming of human-god interface, here has absolved the Theogony’s 
speaker of telling the tale of the animal; much in the vein of humanity, when it appears in 
this storied surrounding of gods, it is already not to be found, its appearance is 
compromised. Naiden: 
  
 The god received not so much a substance as a sign. … These 
signs were essential. Killing was not. It was instrumental.  
 … [Burkert, Vernant, Detienne] overlooked how the victim, like 
any offering, was a sign for the god to answer, or, in acts of divination, to 
manipulate—a means to an end.52 
 
 
Semeia, signa of all types, achieve the indirect exposure of an absent thing within us, by 
adverting our attention from themselves, as from the present of phenomena. The flaring 
of the fire and the trail of smoke; a series of irregular cross-hatcings, as in ink, e.g—do 
not appear ‘as such’ within the mediating context of the ritual; and generally, not for a 
societally motivated action (which includes interpretation). But the sight (or ear, mut. 
mut.) makes use of signs by simultaneous unseeing, by a sight which also overlooks (viz. 
lanthanein). The simplest and the smallest operations of our memory (mnêmosyne) 
                                                51	  Another	  false	  distinction	  on	  which	  Vernant	  (1989)	  based	  much	  argument:	  that	  the	  portions	  represent	  the	  living	  and	  the	  dead	  ‘parts’	  of	  the	  animal.	  52	  Naiden	  (2015)	  p.	  69;	  81.	  Cf.	  Burkert	  (1987),	  p.	  29:	  “In	  the	  history	  of	  mankind,	  ritual	  is	  far	  older	  than	  linguistic	  communication.”	  	  
 47 
dipose us toward engaging with semeia: in essential motion, reaching through what is 
there, at what isn’t, any longer. Yet much more than this, the sign is a prescriptive—to 
remember: it coerces, it entrenches and commends itself for use. The very notion of the 
sign, and the potential to apply it53—as a thing perfected, atemporal—outlasts and 
outshines all passing things which serve to summon it, in time, to manifest it in a setting. 
The materials, phenomena, which actually comprise the sign’s efficacy (the animal, the 
etching, or the sound) are inessential; they efface or else suppress themselves, allowing 
that the absent but intelligible signified ‘appear’ (though not appearing) in its stead. 
 
Though we have long been aware that language constitutes a system of 
arbitrary signs relating to a referent (used here to mean both the thing and 
its conceptual image), it has been tacitly assumed that we recover the 
referent as it is. As though the signifier were only a screen that disappears 
as soon as it indicates the signified, language has been taken as a medium 
that takes us to the referent and recovers it hic et nunc.54 
 
 
+++ 
 
 
They’re never there when you need them. They’re never there when you 
call them. They’re never there when you need them. They’re never there 
when you call them.55 
 
 
In the linguistic dilemma which opens the poem, the shepherd can only enlighten the 
mind to the ultimate context of gods (viz. an infinite, self-enclosed narrative context) by 
dubious and unaccountable means. As a matter of fact, the validity of his assertions 
derives from belief in the poem, if from anywhere, since the whole truth of its many 
                                                53	  Thus	  what	  Derrida	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  transcendental	  signifier,	  in	  On	  Grammatology.	  54	  Pucci	  (1977)	  p.	  15.	  55Talking	  Heads	  (1979)	  “Animals.”	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events, has been solely entrusted to figures born out of the poem’s culmination: the 
Muses—who will not attest for themselves, i.e. outside the words of their vessel. 
Historically speaking, the ritual sacrifice too has been shown to rejuvenate and to 
maintain (in communal regard) an all-powerful context of gods, as remote from 
immediate presence, persuasively present through media and mediation, through formal 
procedures, ‘analysis,’ interpretation, translation and metaphor; all of which ‘speak of’ an 
understood reader—conspirator in the attachment of meaning. Theogony, taking itself 
from the midst of conventional sacrifice; moreover pictures primordial sacrifice as a 
displacing of presence (the ox), which divides, and unites in division, immortals and 
mortals. The animal—like the events that the Muses have knowledge of, and that the 
shepherd would conjure in words—despite having no literal roots in Theogony’s purview, 
is granted existence in retrospect, now as a thing irretrievable in these semeia or signs, 
which inaugurate, and will perpetuate human-divine interaction. Indeed Prometheus’ 
‘trick,’ the instantaneous deployment of such privately premeditated ‘images,’ of tried 
and practiced technê (we compare the way the poet claims stupendous inspiration in an 
arduously drafted piece of text), denies  the reader’s intuition and has troubled the 
validity of all apparent form. The crucial meaning of the sacrificial victim, as a sign 
within the ‘larger conversation,’ the ‘narration’ of divine surrounds, depends upon a near-
unconscious recourse to society (conspiracy, consensus in an ultimately reasonless 
establishment) with those who also entertain the sign; indeed depends upon that policy, 
that mediating past and its reflection in intentional longevity. The crucial valuation of the 
sacrificial animal must linger in the formal repetition, not at all in the materials with 
which the unapparent form is once more called to mind, in this or that instantiation. As 
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the victim is consumed within the altar-fire, serving as a message in the context of 
immortals, so the human subjectivity, which wrestles with appearance, externality, the 
world, as it appears, has been methodically committed to the mediating energy of 
language, to arrive at a political, and seemingly objectified reality. 
 
+++ 
 
The unresolved authority of Hesiod’s performance, whether it will be a human work of 
fiction or the history of gods as told by gods, incites the following consideration. Granted 
that F. Naiden has persuasively defined the motivation for all ritual activity as rooted in 
societal assurance in the gods (the deathless, mindful and remembering recipients of 
coded prayers, the makers of interpretable answers)—we may note that this concern is on 
the order of the judgment, i.e. consciousness (of media, of divination; signs) and should 
be complemented, not in fact contested, by suggestions and analyses of possible 
unconscious motivations. Walter Burkert’s psychoanalytic take on the formalities and 
atmosphere of sacrificial rite (see Homo Necans, esp. I.2-7) deals with the effects of that 
experience upon the human actors and observers. Thus, the matter of the killing, of the 
animals at slaughter, not a message for the gods; yet he explicitly conceives of rite as 
action whose original intention has been swallowed up, forgotten, over time, so that the 
only explanation is, tradition is the cause of the tradition.56  
 
                                                56	  See	  Burkert	  (1987)	  p.	  25f	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Burkert’s general conception of ‘the rite’ is mostly Freud: who had already drawn 
‘conclusions’57 from his work on individual, obsessional neurosis, which extended to the 
causes of the choreographed, group behavior making up religious rite. Neurotically, the 
ego feels offense at some such inborn, ineradicable urge, and it attempts to shut this out, 
or else to quell the urge with “substitutive satisfactions.”58 Freud regards suppression as a 
self-deceptive stage of the continual fixation on an impulse which the ego would forbid; 
in fact a complicated form of our continual submission to an inborn mental energy: he 
notes in fact that many “ceremonials” (formalities, symbolic gestures) come into 
existence as explicitly to enervate or disavow an impulse, but unconsciously to gratify it. 
Freud is then inspired to extrapolate: 
 
The structure of a religion seems also to be founded on the suppression or 
renunciation of certain instinctual trends …. The suppression active in 
religion proves here also to be neither completely effective nor final.59 
 
 
Again, whether ritual’s ultimate urge and fulfilment are seated in unconscious regions, 
for which we cannot give a valid account; or if ritual orients onto the outermost frame of 
the gods as enframers, for which we cannot give a valid account: the effect is that 
conscious (sc. human) behavior is meant to be translated—out of the present—and is 
semiotic in nature. The fire destroys the original offering, but at the same time preserves 
it as an immaterial message. The work of the human practitioners, that which befalls the 
                                                57	  Freud	  (1978)	  Character	  and	  Culture,	  esp.	  p.	  19ff	  	  “obsessive	  acts	  are	  throughout	  and	  in	  all	  their	  details	  full	  of	  meaning	  …	  they	  give	  expression	  both	  to	  persisting	  impressions	  of	  previous	  experiences	  and	  to	  thoughts	  about	  them	  which	  are	  strongly	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  with	  affect.	  …	  they	  are	  to	  be	  interpreted	  either	  historically	  or	  symbolically.”	  58	  Idem,	  p.	  224.	  59	  Idem,	  p.	  24.	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particular victim in any one instance of rite, has primarily formal and indirect value: 
immediate presence is hidden because overlooked (lanthanein), and perhaps 
automatically seen through to something remembered. The separate contentions of 
Naiden and Burkert—that sacrifice moved the immortals, or moved the unconscious—
may not be so irreconciliable: percepts, in either, are rendered the shadows of things 
imperceptible; various, perishing things, which are met with the look of oblivion, power 
awareness of permanent signs and of archetypes. So, as in Burkert’s most general terms: 
 
a behavioral pattern ... has lost its primary function, but … persists in a 
new function, that of communication, … confirmed by the corresponding 
behavior in the partner, who understands the ritual communication 
because of its predetermined stereotypy.60 
 
 
Ritualized killing, destroying by fire—perhaps the term ‘offering’ covers the gamut of 
actions sufficiently: choosing and mentally treating this thing as an offering—is a 
destruction inciting its own substitution. The ending of life and consuming of matter belie 
observation of permanent and immaterial signage.61 The animal’s death, and the 
treatment of actual bodies, is like the exhaust from the teleological engine of living inside 
a religious contextualization—as far as “the object serving as sign is exchangeable.”62 
Offerings predicate answers; the thought of community with the beyond has thus 
preordained sacrifice. Animals and other offerings have but an abstract and general 
weight, as does currency, or an electrical current: we know that sacrificants sought out 
the victims most ‘pure in appearance,’ colloquially (free of all prominent defects; 
                                                60	  Burkert	  (1987)	  p.	  23.	  61	  As	  Blake	  said	  way	  better.	  62	  Burkert,	  (1987)	  p.	  41.	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homogenous coat, even monochromatic), in general; and that the victims were costumed 
(kallierein); that they were bound and constrained if indocile (‘unceremonious’); and, as 
it happens, that basically no artefactual evidence speaks for the human participants’ guilt 
or compassion63—as if they were not even there. The archaeological evidence does show 
that, even as far back as Paleolithic communities, people deliberately made 
reconstructions of sacrificed victims, employing the leftover skin, fur, the bones and the 
horns (or whathaveyou) to dress up a model of clay; or the animal matter might be put to 
use as a ritual instrument later; on other occasions, a monument might mark the place of a 
sacrifice.64 All of this works to suggest that participants came to the ritual version of 
death or destruction as something alchemical, vanishing victims to regions of 
permanence, formal existence; away from the state of mortality, and its 
phenomenological counterpart: basic alterity, which is the law of the present.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                63	  Note	  how	  my	  view	  here	  vindicates	  some	  Burkert	  and	  refutes	  some.	  	  64	  See	  Burkert,	  p.	  13ff,	  p.	  39.	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IV. IN PERPETUAM  
 
My son, a god more powerful than the one who made him, elder than the 
one who created him, sit on your throne, as the terror you inspire is 
great.65 
 
You have nothing to fear my son. You are a latent appliance-fetishist, it 
appears to me.66 
 
 
Before considering ‘Pandora,’ but, as well, by way of pondering the fire at the center of 
the Hesiodic myth, and its connection to that universe’s culminating deity and king 
forever, Zeus, I would prefer to forge a detour through an older, sacred text, which has a 
parallel concern for the establishment of humankind’s conditions of survival (bios; 
biotos), as punishment and ‘final’ reformation. A section of text from the Book of the 
Heavenly Cow, which was prevalent during both Middle and New Kingdom Egypt, 
explained how the godking, all powerful Re, had once plotted the death of all humans, 
but, as this was being accomplished, the god changed his mind and averted their doom. 
He had summoned together the council of all of the gods, in his outrage for humankind’s 
vaguest offense, the employment of “words of conspiracy.” Re’s first decision to fully 
extinguish humanity takes on the form of a goddess (his “Eye”), who will follow the 
terrified humans, committed and made for attrition. But then, for the ruined, forsaken 
humanity, mercy arrives in the form of an afterthought: possible governance. Realizing 
they (humankind) could be managed if generally kept within bounds, Re contrives to 
outwit his own “Eye” (the personification of wrath) and release humankind from her jaws 
                                                65	  Nun	  addresses	  Re.	  Book	  of	  the	  Heavenly	  Cow.	  66	  L.	  Ron	  Hoover	  addresses	  Joe.	  (Zappa,	  1979)	  “A	  Token	  of	  My	  Extreme”	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of oblivion. This he achieves by creating a counterfeit blood with an ocean of literal beer, 
which the goddess imbibes until no more aware of the humans. 
 
The beer and fake-blood (a hendiadys) are reproduced, as the story explicitly says, on a 
festive occasion among the Egyptians, in memory of this so sombre salvation. The 
ferment embodies the turning-point and the persistence of human society after becoming 
subjected to total destruction: decay becomes novel vitality. Some of the earliest writing 
available to us for study (from Mesopotamia) is the recording of rations of beer which 
officials allotted for ‘undersigned’ laborers.67 Harnessing natural yeast and directing their 
energy into a regular (i.e. predictable) cycle of change is undoubtedly primal technology, 
mirroring the work of politicization, inseparable from it. And just as the bloodthirst of Re 
was embodied, and worked independently of him thereafter; his sudden reversal of 
purpose is also embodied, created by linguistic doubling, taking the somewhat surprising 
appearance of sourdough starter. 
 
 Re said “I will govern (sekhem) them as king by diminishing 
them.” And so Sekhmet, the breadpaste of night, came into being to wade 
across their blood from Herakleopolis. 
 
 
Indeed the sourdough technique of feeding milled red emmer berries and fresh water to 
an old decaying “breadpaste” of the same, which then digested these ingredients (by 
naturally occurring lactobacilli and yeast; or by divine decree, depending on the era), and 
incorporated them into itself—was first employed by the Egyptians, whose economy and 
governmental structures were in no small part constructed to accommodate the bread 
                                                67	  (Macgregor,	  2011)	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production.68 Working overnight on said digestion, by the morning the resulting paste 
was noticeably living and supplied the vital energy (the leavening) for countless loaves of 
bread; but there was always some proportion left decaying, so the process was perpetual 
and virtually unlimited.  
 
The starter is homogenous, suspended in a state of convalesence and decay; the semi-
liquid mixture serves in fact to foster an invisible collective force which may be fed 
forever. This is very much in keeping with the fire of Prometheus: both vital and 
consumptive force, continually turning new materia which touch it to its own component 
energies. Herakleitos: 
 
κόσµον τόνδε, τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων, οὔτε τις θεῶν οὐτε ἀνθρώπων 
ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔστιν καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον, ἁπτόµενον µέτρα 
καὶ ἀποσβεννύµενον µέτρα. 
 
 This one and single order in which all partake—no god, no human 
being made it. It was, is, and will be everlasting fire: growing large and 
dwindling in all proportion.69 
 
 
Fire is the second gift Prometheus secures for humankind, though not in league with 
them—more accurately using them as foil, in malevolence to Zeus. The use, the 
harnessing of fire as an instrument, enables repetition for the sacrificial model (cf. Theog. 
v. 567). Had the king of gods succeeded in depriving humankind of this most crucial 
force of mediation, sacrifice would just have been an instance, not a custom and 
technology of offering up messages to gods for their responses. Yet the sacrificial fire (as 
                                                68	  Jacob,	  H.E.	  (2014)	  	  69	  fr.	  30	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per Naiden) seems to finalize the efforts of abstraction which pervade the whole of ritual 
activity. Atop an altar, fire served to mediate between the present spectacle of bodies that 
must perish and the (theorized existence of the) deathless and invisible intelligences, 
capable of gleaning formal ‘substance’ from destruction. 
 
+++ 
 
In his outrage at deception in the sacrificial portions, Zeus immediately whisks away all 
fire from the purview and the consciousness of human beings. Hidden, it is nonetheless 
immediately given back, by alternate concealment (cf. ‘signifieds’ arrived at via signs). 
As a phenomenon—self-overwhelming, -superceding, fed upon and feeding on itself—
the fire calls us toward acknowledgement of universal formlessness, a general alterity of 
energy as paradox of order, constitution (as per Husserl, for instance, by whose standards 
really nothing rests in formal definition). But the fire given humans is however 
emblematically controlled in its expression to a great degree (confined within a hollowed 
bulb of fennel), and intended for deployment on command upon an altar, therefore 
centering the temenos prefiguring Euclidean geometry. To say that someone owns it in 
advance and as an object, which would have to make it finite, and yet also reproducible 
as surely as the name by which we speak of it—this basically presents us with the 
insolence of language in its différance: our fire has beginning, middle, end. And that 
extent, or form, now indicates the interface of gods and human beings. 
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In another scene, the battle between Typhôeus and Zeus, an all-encompassing ‘explosion’ 
of this elemental force obscures the equal and yet opposite contenders, discombobulates 
the features of the world;70 and in that formless surge of flame, the future order of 
existence waits and wavers (v. 836f). Typhôeus, indeed the final obstacle to Zeus’ plan 
for order in the universe—a child of the Earth in love with Tartaros, the landscape of 
mortality—the monstrum, is a manifold of moving pieces thoroughly aflame. His limbs 
are tireless (akamatos, an ‘epithet’ of fire); from his ever shifting trunk a hundred snake-
heads leer with eyes of fire.  
 
φωναὶ δ' ἐν πάσῃσιν ἔσαν δεινῇς κεφαλῇσι, 
παντοίην ὄπ' ἰεῖσαι ἀθέσφατον· ἄλλοτε µὲν γὰρ 
φθέγγονθ' ὥς τε θεοῖσι συνιέµεν, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε 
ταύρου ἐριβρύχεω µένος ἀσχέτου ὄσσαν ἀγαύρου, 
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε λέοντος ἀναιδέα θυµὸν ἔχοντος, 
ἄλλοτε δ' αὖ σκυλάκεσσιν ἐοικότα 
 
In the horrifying heads there were all sorts of voices, 
talking—more than any god can speak of—sometimes 
voices such as gods may comprehend, but then  
at other times, the noises of a chiseled bull, deep-lowing, or 
again a lion, free of shame at heart,  
or like a pack of dogs …71 
 
 
The fusion of identities, fluidity of meaning which this powerful vociferation brings to 
mind; the unpredictability in Typhôeus, who must be called innumerable, more than all 
else challenges the purpose and intention of the mighty Zeus, who famously “distributes 
what belongs to each immortal, rank and title.”72 A political unification (sc. under one 
system or ideological body) defeats and replaces the daunting display of sensorial 
                                                70	  cf.	  the	  ending	  of	  Aesch.	  Prometheus	  Bound.	  71	  Theog.	  v.	  829-­‐34.	  72	  cf.	  foretold	  v.	  112;	  achieved,	  just	  after	  Typhôeus	  defeated,	  v.	  885.	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oneness in Typhôeus (‘actual’ body, chaotic). The power of fire, innate to the subject of 
Typhôeus “flickering under the brows, in the glance” (v. 827), is in contrast achieved 
through a well-tailored instrumentation, a weapon external to Zeus (heileto d’hopla v. 
853). The Kyklôpes, smithies enclosed in the Earth for their service, when Zeus becomes 
king; who permit him this access to fire, indeed are the names of these ‘instruments:’ 
Thunder, Bolt, Flash (“and they fashioned and gave him the lightning” t’ edosan teuxan 
te keraunon v. 140-1). Surely, this iconic arsenal makes all the difference, determines a 
form for the end to this burgeoning deadlock approaching on formlessness: out of the 
seething and pancosmic disarray, Typhôeus falls in a heap, and the reign of Olympian 
Zeus has begun. From the heat of the bolt which decides the ‘dispute,’ and the last dying 
breath of the monster, in simile, all of the earth is transmuted as minerals are by the 
technê of smelting. 
 
πολλὴ δὲ πελώρη καίετο γαῖα 
αὐτµῇ θεσπεσίῃ, καὶ ἐτήκετο κασσίτερος ὣς 
τέχνῃ ὑπ' αἰζηῶν ἐν ἐυτρήτοις χοάνοισι 
θαλφθείς, ἠὲ σίδηρος, ὅ περ κρατερώτατός ἐστιν, 
οὔρεος ἐν βήσσῃσι δαµαζόµενος πυρὶ κηλέῳ 
τήκεται ἐν χθονὶ δίῃ ὑφ' Ἡφαίστου παλάµῃσιν· 
ὣς ἄρα τήκετο γαῖα σέλαι πυρὸς αἰθοµένοιο. 
 
Greatly burned capacious Earth 
in gusts of godly breath: and she was melted 
as a piece of tin, when heated up excessively by craft and 
in a well-fit mould; or iron, from the mountain woods, 
the strongest of the metals—as the fingers of Hêphaistos 
with their burning fire melt it to submission, in the godly earth— 
so in the surge of fire’s light the earth was melted.73 
 
 
                                                73	  v.	  861-­‐7.	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Non-differentiable,  gaia as earth in the physical or the empirical sense, and as one of the 
narrative’s oldest (yea ageless) most primary actors, the great divine mother, submits to 
the indirect force of this weapon, which rescues its master from being dissolved in the 
blaze of his equally abled opponent. The fire that conquers—the lightning that enters and 
settles all things, as Herakleitos elsewhere pronounces— unlike that of Typhôeus, is 
artefactual. Whereas the heralding firestorm, which is emitted from Typhôeus, blurs all 
divisions and rattles ‘the fundament’ (v. 845-53), Zeus’ attack, with distinguishing 
weaponry, works like a process of technical (qua metallurgical) purification, a tool for 
abstracting from mixtures of elements. Earth, as the ground and the basis of speaker and 
listener—actor, observer; thus, all—has been here reimagined with reference to 
formalized acts of repeated intention: the Earth is now like the production of artisan gods 
in the “deified soil” (a more exact trans. of above chthoni diêi). The physical (natural) 
‘earth of the simile’ houses the gods and the abstracting, rendering processes (i.e. the 
forge) to which primary Earth, or the ‘earth of the episode,’ loses its image: the figure 
eclipses the model. The dawn and exemplar, within the Theogony, of its essential genetic 
progression, of natural birth (cf. geminal wordplay upon the inception of physica: Gaia 
… egeinato v. 126) Earth becomes unrecognizable, due to the work of her technical 
counterpart: forgery, mass-reproduction—of, by the way, always inanimate objects (and 
instruments). In the distorting or else reformation of Earth via technical melting, we thus 
hear a muffling echo of natural birth (compare gaia … etêketo above, with the previous 
gaia … etikten, e.g., at v. 45). The difference in these ‘reproductions,’ is patent, indeed as 
the difference between the ‘two’ fires, especially granted the somewhat particular scene 
of the simile: mixis like sex creates novelty out of existing identities (sc. constitutions); 
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the forger, however, can filter and break the particular down to homogenous substance 
for filling a mould, for repeating existing identities. Herein, the flood of alterity, ‘mortal’ 
phenomena, seems to have been redirected, that ‘newfound’ materials, rather than mingle 
to make new materials, serve to perpetuate (propagate copies of ) image-identities, 
nominal forms. And so Zeus in complete iconography scourges, transfigures the face of 
the earth, in the act of extinguishing unbounded, fluid ‘identity’ (Typhôeus, Earth’s most 
formidable child, containing a good enough likeness to so many animals) that he 
completely establish the total extent of his cosmic bureaucracy—titles and offices fixed 
for the deathless celestials (cf. v. 881-5, see especially: “violently forced to be judged by 
these titles” timaôn krinanto biêphi).  
 
+++ 
 
The ultimate (or else, at least impressively conclusive seeming) founding of the reign of 
Zeus ‘most-powerful’—concisely represented in that action, his determining the merits of 
the rest of the immortals (diedassato v. 885: the verb applied as well to the more physical 
‘arrangements’ of Prometheus, v.536)—this critical foundation has been neatly couched 
itself between the quashing of an outside threat (Typhôeus) and an inner or domestic 
‘threat,’ which we will cover here. Established king, the god’s immediate, first exploit is 
in ‘marriage,’ yet the feat is no less monumental, and no less conducive to his 
permanence ‘in office;’ no less fatal. “Firstly, Zeus took Thought to be his bedmate” 
(Mêtis v. 886). Zeus consumes his ‘wife’ (imagine: whole, intact?) when she would be 
delivered of their first conceived, who comes into the light instead (i.e. the light of 
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endless life) from Zeus’ head: his final child Athênê (who follows after many children 
not produced asexually).74 Though Thought “knew more than gods and human beings,” 
(pleista … eiduian) Zeus easily misleads her with “some bullshit” (dolôi … aimuliosi 
logoisin v. 888f); at the same time under-handedly “emplacing” her within an inner 
cavity (the nêdus, sometimes womb or stomach; generally, any hollow interstice), “that 
she would have a part in his deliberations, good and evil” (sumphrassaito v.900). 
 
In so doing, Zeus has brought an end to the predominant dynamic of the speaker’s cosmic 
revelation. What might very well be called the issue of divine succession—i.e. that a self-
aggrandized god is greatly threatened by their scion and indeed ‘must’ turn against 
them—as a plot-device, is certainly “the backbone of the Theogony.”75 The graphic, 
atavistic pattern carries on from Ouranos and Kronos down to Zeus: the basic narrative: 
the father-god desires to annihilate the products of his mixis, fearing filial ingratitude and 
ruin from his children; he is ultimately met with great resistance by (the) Earth, who lets 
the child triumph. Certainly, the paradigms of sexual, and then cross-generational abuse 
within these tales are intertwined and cause each other: in his grapplings with fear, if not 
outside these dramas, each paternal god will overlook and further violently suppress 
(assault) the mother’s will and try to stop the body’s (nature’s) processes. By his very 
constitution seemingly unable to desist from these proliferating “games,” perhaps, he 
tries to cancel birth, to stave off progeny from taking his prestigious and authoritative 
title. This indeed entails extreme abuses; as we know, in this regard the godking Zeus is 
no exception. Zeus instead distinguishes himself because he actuates a permanent 
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dominion where his predecessors, even though immortal, are defeated in the blindness of 
their egoism. 
 
 
(Fig.) The three generations of Heavenly dynasts and partners: 
 
Ouranos—Earth 
 
Kronos—Rheia 
 
Zeus—Metis, et al. 
 
 
Though the figure above employs no repeat terms, in denoting the sexual partners; 
importantly, Earth does not only bear Kronos, but all by herself creates Ouranos, and as a 
surrogate mother bears Zeus (on the strength of the figurative language).76 She also 
presides over ends for these dynasts: creating the adamant sawteeth for Kronos to unman 
and overwhelm Ouranos; joining with Rheia to overthow Kronos by dressing a rock as a 
baby. Aside from revealing to Zeus (as she once informed Kronos) that, in time, an 
unwieldy child is meant to succeed him, become his undoing, the Earth both creates and 
unleashes the near-fatal threats to his ‘final’ dominion (Typhôeus, the Titans before him). 
Where all the paternal, the so-called Ouranian (“Heavenly”) gods are compelled (and 
repulsed) by the fear of succession, and move with a truly intensive concern for 
themselves against everything, as to ensure their longevity (granted their actions provoke 
the successor’s resentment)—the Earth over time will confound the conception that she 
                                                76	  Earth	  hides	  him	  in	  Krete,	  in	  a	  cave,	  “in	  the	  hidden	  depth	  of	  holy	  earth”	  (zatheês	  hupo	  keuthesi	  gaiês,	  v.	  483)	  and	  releases	  him	  later.	  We	  have	  to	  compare	  the	  explicitly	  sexual,	  earlier	  telling	  of	  Ouranos,	  Heaven,	  who	  buries	  the	  children	  of	  Earth	  in	  “Earth’s	  hiding	  place	  [keuthmôni],	  not	  then	  releasing	  them	  into	  the	  light”	  (kai	  es	  phaos	  ouk	  anieske	  v.	  156-­‐8),	  where	  they	  are	  at	  a	  vantage	  moreover	  to	  castrate	  the	  god	  when	  he	  enters	  again.	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is, in general, serving particular ends (viz. protecting herself or devoted, indentured to 
somebody). From the beginning, instead, she has fostered and functions to power alterity, 
working to bring about terms that are yet to exist (the unborn and expressly ‘unbidden’), 
and not then indebted to manifest terms, to protecting existing personas. She instigates 
lapse of established identities, all of which she had permitted existence, in service of 
‘infinite’ (unconstrained) mixis and proliferation. Indeed, her primordial action, which 
grounds and begins the ‘Succession Myth,’ emblematizes her virtually constant resistance 
to manifest forms—in the drafting, producing of which, she is nonetheless always 
entangled.  
 
Γαῖα δέ τοι πρῶτον µὲν ἐγείνατο ἶσον ἑωυτῇ 
Οὐρανὸν ἀστερόενθ', ἵνα µιν περὶ πάντα καλύπτοι, 
ὄφρ' εἴη µακάρεσσι θεοῖς ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεί, …. 
 
Earth of course first produced Heaven, the starry, 
a double, to shroud her entirely, that she become 
the unshifting foundation of gods, of the blessed.77 
 
 
Evolved out of nothing,78 spontaneous, autogenetic, the first comprehensible entity in the 
Theogony’s deified cosmos—as over against the collection of void-like personas (viz. 
Chaos, Night, Darkness, Day, Atmosphere) mentioned before this quotation; who barely 
have narrative presence—the primary figure of Earth thus primarily cancels, replaces 
herself with an ‘equal’ or ‘double’ of opaque and yet incorporeal ‘being.’ This violently 
lingering shroud over Earth, a most consummate work of suppression (kalupsis) 
concurrently stands as the basis (the edos or grounds) for divinity, font of the honestly 
                                                77	  Theog.	  v.	  126-­‐8	  78	  Since	  Gaia’s	  genetic	  connection	  to	  Chaos	  is	  hardly	  in	  evidence.	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numberless, permanent figures. Even though, typically, over the course of Theogony, 
Earth and the tripartite chain of male presences equally act by concealment of persons 
(identities)—always, the father intends to negate in perpetuam, keeping his name and his 
power preserved, while the mother preserves by concealing for only a time, and moreover 
it seems she has brought herself into existence to offer herself, as a victim is offered, to 
violent abuse, to a cycle of violent abuses, continual vanishment—‘therefore’ the 
motionless home of the pantheon. Earth’s own self-suppression, via doubling, invents and 
pulls the strings of patriarchal, oppositional, self-interested identities. The males are 
hence the passing terms in earth’s unchanging, purposed mission (see last excerpt, 
notably the grammar of intention: hina min … kaluptoi, ophr’ eiê … aiei). Perhaps 
Earth’s ‘program’ as a whole is thus an anti-stance. Without effecting any outward sign 
of her unrest and transformations of intent and disposition, she undoes the ‘fully-formed,’ 
the ‘adult’ figures she herself created, rescued, brought to power. 
 
As the middle term of three in the Theogony’s dynastic series, Kronos both performs as 
the suppressed and hateful child and, in turn, as the suppressor full of dread in his 
maturity (while Ouranos contrarily is born without adversity or precedent, and Zeus, at 
last, succeeds in breaking free of the ‘foretold’ succession). Kronos leaves the womb 
prepared, debriefed in fact that he will best his father, yet he imitates the wrongs which in 
his father so disgusted him, and so invites the selfsame ruin, miming Heaven’s character 
(cf., of Zeus as well, ho d’ ouranôi embasileuei, “he was the king in [place of] Heaven”). 
Although Earth at first confided in the unborn Kronos—rescued and was mutually 
rescued by the child from the former king’s debauches—she unflinchingly elects to take 
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the burdens of his later ‘wife’ upon herself, and undermine Kronos’ swollen tenure. For 
the pregnant Rheia plead her case in secret to the primal mother Earth, away from 
Kronos, that she find some liberation for her children: 
 
καὶ τοὺς µὲν κατέπινε µέγας Κρόνος, ὥς τις ἕκαστος 
νηδύος ἐξ ἱερῆς µητρὸς πρὸς γούναθ' ἵκοιτο, 
τὰ φρονέων, ἵνα µή τις … 
ἄλλος … ἔχοι βασιληίδα τιµήν. 
 
Great Kronos swallowed them, as each one made its way  
toward mother’s knees, from deep within  
her sacred body—He was thinking no one else …  
would lay their hand upon the title of the king.79  
 
 
The notion that Rheia derives from intransitive rheein, a verb meaning “flow,” as of 
water, is already common in records of Classical thought; it inspired in part a Socratic 
discussion on formlessness as the reality of our experience.80 Certainly normal 
morphology renders the god Rheia’s name as the nominal form of this motion, of lapsing 
from form, an idea of all flux without thereby involving particular matter (a subject or 
object, beginning or end to the process of flowing; cf. the archê of apeirôn). So luridly, 
Kronos “drinks down” (katepine) the manifestations of life from this flow as they newly 
occur; he engulfs and enshrouds all ‘becoming’ to serve his elected identity. Earth on the 
contrary willfully risks her position and puts out of mind her connection to Kronos to 
undam ‘the flowing of Rheia,’ directing its course from voracious and fully-formed 
figures which only assimilate unto themselves and cannot allow genuine otherness, 
furthermore free of deterioration and death. 
                                                79	  Theog.	  v.	  459-­‐62.	  80	  As	  opposed	  to	  the	  lasting	  distinctions	  comprising	  our	  language.	  See	  Plato,	  Cratylus	  402b;	  437,	  440b-­‐c.	  In	  addition,	  see	  the	  fragments	  of	  Chrysippus;	  on	  the	  gods	  as	  merely	  aspects	  of	  a	  pandeistic	  cosmos;	  and	  that	  Rhea	  was	  the	  flow	  of	  water.	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Earth, for both Kronos and Zeus, will predict the succession;81 and really, the father’s 
offenses, the crimes and unseemly decisions (cf. aeikea meisato v. 166) both come from 
and answer this rather formidable thought of the foretold successor. Where Earth is thus 
always proponent and herald of transience, unbound creation and natural change (or 
succession), beginning, in fact, with complete self-effacement (v.127), the series of 
fathers are equally characterized by incorrigibility: fear—that collapse of identity (their 
own effacement, in fact) is a truly determined necessity— fuels the apparently futile work 
of suppressing (subsuming, digesting) externals and novel occurrences. Earth both creates 
and empowers the cyclical lapsing of ‘opposite terms’ while remaining a self-effaced 
substrate, an anti-position (so, via Seligman, cf. the anaximandrian apeirôn actively 
functions as absent and unrepresentable cause of the balance of opposite forces—
poeticized as adikia, injustices).82 Earth having forfeited selfhood becomes like a 
backdrop for merely provisional figures,83 obsessed with achieving their own definitions 
in negative. So, the fond hope of achieving eternal identity (proto-political office) 
persistently falters; is found to be caught on its genealogical root in a prior, eternal 
indefinite. Verily, Earth is not born—though the speaker has set out to show “the 
beginning” in clarity, they have omitted a verb which would designate birth or essential 
existence, and left us an obstinate noun-phrase—and further, despite that the speaker 
                                                81	  As	  Ouranos	  mingles	  directly	  with	  Earth,	  his	  awareness	  of	  burgeoning	  threats	  of	  succession	  is	  rather	  direct	  (sc.	  phenomenal,	  sense	  and	  emotion),	  whereas	  the	  later	  gods	  “learn”	  of	  the	  threat	  indirectly	  (sc.	  signs:	  phrazein,	  peuthesthai.	  Cf.	  v.463ff	  and	  v.	  891-­‐3).	  82	  Seligman,	  (1975).	  83See	  also	  v.	  117,	  pantôn	  edos	  asphales	  aiei	  athanatôn.	  Though,	  of	  course,	  all	  of	  the	  patriarchs	  cannot	  have	  literal,	  physical	  endpoints	  in	  death;	  they	  importantly	  take	  on	  the	  risk	  on	  a	  nominal	  level,	  when	  entering	  proto-­‐political	  discourse,	  as	  far	  as	  they	  center	  themselves	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  title	  or	  status.	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presents her just after the primal existence of Chaos, (v.116) they deem her a constant 
and, hence, ahistorical (aiei). 
 
+++ 
 
We are now in position to gauge the extent of the paradigm shift that is Zeus’ unlimited 
reign. As above has been mentioned, the themes which the dynasts before him 
grotesquely established are certainly found in his story—the violent obtaining of power, 
the immanent thought of succession, the violent suppression of sexual partner in view of 
escaping that threat—and yet Zeus is successful. The god, who when firstly created could 
not be discerned from a very large stone with the formal cachets of an infant (indeed it is 
hard to imagine that tactic succeeding; see sparganisasa … lithon v.485)—the god Zeus, 
for whom fire was first of all rendered a graspable instrument, stands through the 
onslaught of all revolutions the Earth can unleash (both the Titans and Typhôeus), and 
will defy and disprove the Earth’s ‘prophecy,’ ending the chain of successions. Earth, out 
of character, lends her support to the codification of Zeus’ dominion, and openly argues 
for Zeus to be granted an infinite tenure (v. 883ff), decisively pressing for this by 
rhetorical prowess (see phradmosynêisin). Within the electrified concourse of gods, she 
engenders an unprecedented political rally for permanence (ôtrunon basileuemen … 
euruopa Zên).  
 
Certainly, Zeus’ ‘election’ depends on the battle with Typhôeus, Earth’s last denoted 
production, who therefore embodies the final resistance to lasting (political) order (that 
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order itself a resistance to natural processes, and to the truthful awareness of Earth, of the 
need for succession, alterity). Rapidly, just in the wake of Typhôeus’ death, inexplicably, 
history veers from the course of Earth’s ‘prophecies.’ Though she foresees it, in fact a 
superior, unwieldy child does not threaten Zeus; she has prophesied true, and yet turned 
on her truthful awareness in service to Zeus, the formidable patriarch. Certainly, in the 
assembly of gods that elects Zeus ‘forever’, the Earth does not act as a prophet, but 
demagogue, speaking with purpose to fashion the future of Zeus’ unlimited and 
incontestable kingdom. Here likewise, although she recalls the pre-destined successor to 
Zeus, she will filter her knowledge by cunning (again phradmosynêisi v. 891) clearly to 
help and to extricate Zeus from the web of necessity, as from the current of present 
alterity—bidding him enter his infamous, permanent redoubt. But radically, Earth’s 
abrupt switch to a stance which the status quo motivates and which intends preservation 
of all definition (sc. timai); as also the switch from unserving predictions (of truth, what 
will happen) to hopeful prescriptions (which work by a different authority)… this 
dispositional change has a somewhat disturbing material precedent: Earth as a whole has 
been tempered by fire. And not only fire, but indirect casts from the smoldering lightning, 
from fire as instrument, object and property, and in its ultimate routing of fire as wild, 
unbound and at each instant not to be recognized.84 Earth, in the indirect light of this 
finishing agon of fire (n.b. “selai puros:” the heat of the flame not at issue) has been 
redefined, i.e. ruined, reshaped in its contours; collapsed and refashioned (têketai).85  
 
                                                84	  Whereas	  the	  lightning	  is	  perfectly	  iconographical,	  Typhôeus’	  hundred	  flaming	  snakeheads	  are	  a	  screen	  of	  anonymity	  when	  weighed	  against	  the	  limitless	  creations	  of	  the	  voice	  that	  they	  achieve.	  85	  For	  this	  and	  what	  follows,	  refer	  to	  the	  excerpt	  on	  v.	  861-­‐7.	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The melting of Earth can be seen, rather thought indirectly through simile only. The Earth 
that we share with the Greeks as with all (and which Husserl calls by der Lebenswelt: 
lifeworld) was, in their cosmology, generally nearer the whole of ‘the picture,’ a singular 
planet encircled by heaven, the vault. In the actual simile, earth as approximate whole 
(pelôrê) is ‘replaced by’ (conceived via reference to) some individual, miniscule piece 
taken out of the Earth (kassiteros; sidêros … oureos) to fit the intended designs of a god 
or a craftsman, and certainly both (technêi hyp’ aizêôn … thalphtheis. … en chthoni diêi 
hyph’ Hêphaistou—n.b. the heat is thus explicit on the level of the figural reflection, not 
the actual event). The metals, melting overseen in fact, by instrument and purpose 
(choanoisi … palamêisin), will solidify anew, perhaps homogenized and ‘purified,’ 
perhaps within a mold, so that a well-familiar form is once more manifest. The dying 
breath of Typhôeus, thus fatally electrified, divinely-fallen, all throughout the earth 
(autmêi thespesiêi), as fire in the service of the mind’s designs (dia boulas, as often 
Zeus’) casts the very fundament of Earth (again the edos of immortal context) merely as 
the incidental, indirect expression of the grandeur of the lightning bolt. So Earth no more 
resists the interminable dominion of the king of gods and humans, but she argues in his 
interests, she becomes another instrument; the topos of the forge, the fire’s prison (and 
the prison of the Titan gods), the sanctum of its endless labor, no more biological. 
 
+++ 
 
ἀσκήσας παλάµῃσι, χαριζόµενος Διὶ πατρί. 
τῇ δ' ἔνι δαίδαλα πολλὰ τετεύχατο, θαῦµα ἰδέσθαι, 
κνώδαλ' ὅσ' ἤπειρος δεινὰ τρέφει ἠδὲ θάλασσα· 
τῶν ὅ γε πόλλ' ἐνέθηκε, χάρις δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄητο, 
θαυµάσια, ζωοῖσιν ἐοικότα φωνήεσσιν. 
αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ δὴ τεῦξε καλὸν κακὸν ἀντ' ἀγαθοῖο, 
 70 
ἐξάγαγ' ἔνθά περ ἄλλοι ἔσαν θεοὶ ἠδ' ἄνθρωποι. 
 
Hephaistos, as a favor for the Father Zeus, had given it a form and 
dressed it over with intelligent designs to catch the eye: 
terrific creatures, all that boundless space and ocean  
nurture, he imprinted. Beauty breathed on all of them: 
near-living, almost chattering—a wonder…. And so 
Zeus had finished dressing up the pain, to balance gain. 
He lead her out to all the other gods, and humankind.86 
 
                                                          
Humans within the Theogony only pertain to the epoch of Zeus’ dominion, the ‘final’ and 
lasting, the weaponized.87 Humans pertain to an Earth irrevocably changed by the 
instrument, lightning, which canceled Typhôeus’ fluid infinity of presentations; an Earth 
without actual animals (zôia, a form of the verbal root zô, “I am living”), though humans 
engage indirectly with animals as the illegible something beneath the duplicitous signs 
(of the sacrifice). Now, and in full culmination, the humans are only permitted a future 
existence, an ongoing cultural presence and character (e.g. the form of the sacrifice: just 
at this moment, the whole of their culture) as channeled through products of artistry: 
caught in forever-uncomfortable bonds, to the magical sculpture of woman, created by 
Zeus in his terrible wrath. As we now have summarily followed the god through those 
trials by which he defined himself permanent master and universe-architecht—we can 
begin to perceive how this gift, of the rootstock of women to mortal humanity, really 
commemorates, propagates Zeus’ exceptional difference; and translates the godking’s 
‘achievement’ to mortal horizons. The god who had saved his political status by bearing 
the child of Thought from the crown of his head; and whose powerful tools had 
                                                86	  Of	  the	  proto-­‐woman’s	  headdress,	  Theog.	  v.	  580-­‐6.	  87	  The	  sacrifice	  belongs	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  digressive	  narratives,	  as	  Hamilton	  terms	  them,	  which	  interrupt	  the	  forward	  flowing	  motion	  of	  the	  poem	  .	  The	  sacrifice	  is	  probably	  the	  latest	  moment	  chronologically,	  within	  the	  poem,	  besides	  the	  introduction	  scene	  wherein	  the	  shepherd	  meets	  the	  muses.	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refashioned the Earth, the great mother—now Zeus will create and produce (from his 
premeditations, decisions; dia boulas) all the conditions for humans, that die, to have kids 
and perpetuate culture (Pandora, unnamed); he has fashioned (commisioned Hêphaistos 
to fashion) from earth a new substitute mother—the origin point of humanity’s presence 
as yet undetermined. The earthen rendition (gaiês gar sumplasse v. 571), the ‘counterfeit’ 
truly becomes overwhelming (i.e. as the truth) with Hephaistos’ final addition: a total 
depiction of earth in its bounty of life. Indeed not only humans but gods are entirely 
spellbound, to see its incredible depth of refinement (v. 588).  
 
The substantive daidala speaks to the artwork’s success in confounding the usually overt 
divide between vital production and technical mimicry (Daedalus being renowned above 
all for machines which afford their possessor a fleetingly functional animal-being: the 
bull for Pasiphaê, wings for himself and his son). The conclusive addition, the headdress, 
though briefly described, will belong to that class of ekphrastic description in Epics: the 
trope of imaginatively surpassing the limits of physical space; and of therefore existing 
more seriously in the mind than as actual artefact. Whereas the shield of Achilles, e.g., or 
Penelope’s shroud, or the mural of Troy in the palace of Dido, etc., exit the realm of the 
actually possible, by their sheer number of details, of narrative scenes and of figures 
supposedly captured and copied—the headdress of Zeus’ creation effects the same 
baffling scope by abstraction, a dearth of expression. The basically single-line ekphrasis 
(knôdal’ hos’ êpeiros…; note the impressive elision) ‘produces’ the Earth surreptitiously, 
not naming any material presence but, rather unusually, speaking instead of “the 
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boundless [expanse], and the ocean;” it conjures “the animals”88 only in all generality, 
not by examples: the object of technê contains “just as many” as Earth and the sea ‘in 
reality.’ West has remarked89 that the diction and formal conception here seems 
reminiscent of Ancient Greek deathmasks—a wrought work of metal which mimicked 
the face of the corpse that it covered. The body this earthen-made, substitute-mother 
enshrouds and memorializes, that body is (Earth as) unbounded and infinite. Now that 
Typhôeus’ myriad animal utterances have been quieted, vanished along with the 
incomprehensible, fiery figure; the godking’s technologization of fire, that remade the 
Earth in its indirect force, will replace the indefinite, endless expressions of earth, with an 
icon, the somehow objectified representations of same: with the likeness of life and of 
utterance (zôoisin eoikota phônêessin).  
 
The godking’s creation completes the occlusion of mortal humanity’s nature and origin: 
this is not woman but likeness thereof (see v. 572); and a copy without an original. Yet, 
proto-woman derives not from absent and unwritten sources (while prior humanity has no 
beginning, inside of the poem) ‘she’ depends on and follows exactly the logical close of 
Theogony’s cosmic arrangement: the final two children in Zeus’ (therefore in the Earth’s) 
genealogy, i.e. Hephaistos, Athênê, the both of them born without sexual union (sc. 
mixis), integrally shape the appearance of Zeus’ designs. In the aftermath, then, of the 
sacrifice—groundless humanity, gaining technologized fire, has thus been coerced to 
effect derivation from inside Theogony’s god-laden universe; and at the same time from 
fiction, objectively speaking, i.e. the perspective of narrator, sharing the secret of Zeus.  
                                                88	  On	  the	  general	  term	  “animal(s),”	  see	  Derrida,	  trans.	  Mallet	  (2008).	  	  89	  In	  his	  commentary	  on	  v.	  582.	  
 73 
 
Humankind’s new way of living (and of reproduction) thus follows the end of what 
Hamilton calls the most general theme of Theogony’s forward progression:90 the fade and 
transition of genealogical into political structure. To temper the lousy amount of archaic 
misogyny, we should consider that Zeus’ creation with great metonymity heralds and 
harbors the whole of ‘new (i.e. political) human existence;’ that far from specifically 
burdening men with ‘the wife’ (though the speaker does dwell overlong on this aspect) 
the ‘vengeance’ of Zeus becomes equally manifest here for the man who will not take a 
wife (gamon pheugôn… v. 603-7), as for him with a wife he calls precious, to which “he 
is joined in his spirit” (kednên … v. 608-10); or else in the wrongs of one’s children, or 
distant relations (chêrôstai ; atartêroio genethlês v. 610-12). The family unit, its constant 
extension and maintenance, seems the more general ‘curse’ for which Zeus’ production 
becomes both the scapegoat and spectacle. When the unmarried man suffers because his 
inheritance (family name and dominion and property; cf. the immortal timai) must go 
unpreserved and disperse beyond all recognition, since “nobody tends to his agedness” 
(chêtai gêrokomoio), then it would seem the contempt which the poet expresses derives 
from the need to establish a lasting societal presence, a legacy—not from the nature or 
presence of woman implicitly.  
 
Zeus’ donation responds to the human possession of fire as equal and counterpoint (anti 
puros, v. 570). As before, in the custom of sacrifice, fire will transmute the animal bodies 
‘by putting them out of all sight’ (cf. apokruptein, as used in the graphic suppressions of 
children) encrypting ethereal messages there, where materials vanished; the mortal 
                                                90	  Hamilton	  (1989),	  p.	  41.	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society, now reproductively mixis-endowed by a feat of technology, powers across and 
throughout generations in constant decline the unbroken existence of customs, of signs 
we conceive of as pure repetitions, forever applicable—all institutions of nomen and 
numen; tradition, in general. Hence, like the sourdough starter of Re (i.e. Sekhmet), 
Theogony’s semi-moist mixture of Earth will promote an invisible presence, a 
commonwealth-atmosphere, having no absolute limits to vital production, to self-
generation (the uniform starter persists, as the various loaves it engenders are brought to 
perfection and perish, again and again). The invention of Zeus indeed parallels Re’s in a 
curious sense: that the tactics of both of the godkings are purposed to ‘undo’ their earlier 
choices. “The dual-king Re” devised the very threat that the creation and contrivance of 
the ferments both symbolically and literally contravent. And Zeus had first permitted that 
Prometheus offend him with the sacrifice, thus welcoming the anger which ‘requires’ that 
he hide the fire, forge the proto-woman. The regenerative ferments (and the fire) and the 
reproductive artefact of technê—each presented as a keystone to societal persistence (for 
humanity)—are equally self-conscious counter-actions: overwhelmings of the standpoint 
of the self and antithetical reflections.  
 
+++ 
 
 
The decisive point is that man may submit to laws curbing his individual 
intelligence and adaptability for the sake of societal predictability.91 
 
 
Again, where Naiden more exclusively defined ‘the ends’ of sacrificial ritual, in terms of 
an exchange between two ‘cultures’ kept distinct, the gods and humans; Burkert 
                                                91	  Burkert	  (1987),	  p.19	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absolutely looked upon the sacrifice as symptom of unfathomable trauma (strictly 
human) which attended the constructions of ‘political’ communities, beginning with the 
socius united by the hunt. The use of tools, of technê, hopla—changed the prehistoric 
humans to a predatory species ‘overnight;’ and with the power to subdue and kill a wide 
array of animals, came also greater threats of intra-human acts of violence and fatality.92 
Thus, partly, in the manner of a Freudian suppression, hunting channeled the aggression 
of the panic-stricken, earliest communities of humans, from their semblables and onto 
‘something else.’ Successful groups began to settle more significantly, to ‘possess their 
land;’ and the division was increasingly pronounced between interior society, 
predominantly overseen by women, and the less-refined society of men who did the 
hunting and the foreign expeditions. While the former saw in general an increase in 
stability, of structures, of routines and institutions, the exteriorly oriented, masculine 
community continued to pursue new foreign bodies with destructive force. The custom of 
the sacrifice for Burkert was essential in emotionally coping with this most integral 
schism: and the whole of the prolific, formal affectations; ceremonies, laws and 
regulations, which arose around the sacrifice, would situate the unsurpassed necessity to 
kill, within a context (the domestic) which was ever more removed from the arena of the 
wild, the undisciplined and volatile. Custom ‘hid’ the killing in a grand display of forms 
which had been severed from alterity—the universal death of the phenomena in private 
(viz. subjective, incommunicable) ‘knowledge’ or experience.  
 
                                                92	  See	  also	  Burkert,	  Savage	  Energies,	  p.14	  	  “Thus	  from	  the	  very	  start,	  self-­‐destruction	  was	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  human	  race”	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If driven quite unconsciously by fear of self-annihilation (cf. the extremely Greek 
obsession, in the formative mythologies, with cannibals and cycles of familial murder: 
Kronos; Atreus, e.g.), as also by the fear of death as truly universal (Will I suffer, as the 
animals before me? If the mode of life is death?)—it seems harmonious that, consciously, 
within their own reflections and overt expressions, humans would contend (now via 
Naiden)93 that the omnipresent context of the gods was both the ‘end’ and ‘motivation’ 
for their actions. For if sacrificial messages were more and more communal, the 
‘materials’ effecting them were less and less essential, ‘in the lower world;’ and likewise, 
as the format of the custom was internalized and fit for repetition (via fire), the 
participants, the place and time were rendered inessential, uninformative. The culture, in 
proportion as it gains a kind of access (by consensus) to (conceits about) invisible 
domains of the iconic, everlasting (and political) identities, must sacrifice the lifeworld of 
the present as continual alterity (there is no perfect repetition, thus no sign, and no 
objective meaning); must suppress the Earth as finally indefinite (sc. êpeiros). Humanity 
proliferates a mediated image of the Earth, by semiotics (cf. headdress), by instruction in 
ideals; its generations, sinking deep in anonymity, impart their vital energies to 
maintenance of disembodied standards, ideologies, societal dynamics and machinery—in 
short, the ‘body politic.’ That body, like the proto-woman’s, is not quite inhabited, not 
actual; yet, as deceptive phantom, or as waking dream, it has the strength to motivate the 
forfeiture of all authentic presence, the immediate, and namely in the hopeless hope of 
actuating form. The very effort must be doomed to an indefinite extension; and the 
wasting of indefinite materials explicitly defines the new biotos (way of living) for 
humanity, accordingly.  
                                                93	  Naiden’s	  sources	  are	  predominantly	  literary	  and	  artistic,	  i.e.	  self-­‐reflexive.	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οἱ δ' ἔντοσθε µένοντες ἐπηρεφέας κατὰ σίµβλους 
ἀλλότριον κάµατον σφετέρην ἐς γαστέρ' ἀµῶνται· 
 
those drones, remaining in the covered skeps, 
devour someone else’s labor.94 
  
   
Herein the speaker, with seemingly outright misogyny, likens the marriage of woman and 
man to the bond of the drones and the worker-bees. Whereas the workers go flying afar to 
collect new subsistence from wildlife, drones will remain in their place and eventually 
squander the finding. And just so, the spawn of the sculpture “will not share the weight of 
complete desperation, but only of bounty”.95 Regardless of archaic knowledge, we note 
that the simile (more so, its source in the natural world) would judiciously muddle the 
straightforward gender-dichotomy, seeing as indolent drones are the males in the species, 
and worker-bees female. But also regardless of gender, the both of them live kata 
simblous, i.e. in a counterfeit hive, as relied on in beekeeping. Slaving away to fulfill 
someone else’s requirements then is the bane of the whole of the hive, in the bounds of a 
humanly monitored system. As context and construct, a skep or false-beehive 
appropriates all of the aspects involved in that natural process—the making of honey—
pre-emptively, i.e. before there is something to take. The domains of continually 
wearying energy and of fruition are utterly sundered; the insects immersed in 
impoverished mortality garner no taste of the surfeit (Koroios), at which they take aim.   
 
 
                                                94	  Theog.	  v.	  599-­‐600.	  95	  oulomenês	  Peniês	  ou	  sumphoroi,	  alla	  Koroio	  v.	  593.	  Koroios	  can	  also	  mean	  insolence,	  taking	  or	  having	  too	  much.	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